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SUBTREE PERFECTNESS, BACKWARD INDUCTION, AND
NORMAL-EXTENSIVE FORM EQUIVALENCE FOR SINGLE
AGENT SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING UNDER
ARBITRARY CHOICE FUNCTIONS
NATHAN HUNTLEY AND MATTHIAS C. M. TROFFAES
Abstract. We revisit and reinterpret Selten’s concept of subgame perfectness
in the context of single agent normal form sequential decision making, which
leads us to the concept of subtree perfectness. Thereby, we extend Hammond’s
characterization of extensive form consequentialist consistent behaviour norms
to the normal form and to arbitrary choice functions under very few assump-
tions. In particular, we do not need to assume probabilities on any event or
utilities on any reward. We show that subtree perfectness is equivalent to
normal-extensive form equivalence, and is sufficient, but, perhaps surprisingly,
not necessary, for backward induction to work.
1. Introduction
In a single agent sequential decision problem, at any stage, one has two ways
of looking at its solution: the problem can be considered either in its simplest
form—discarding any past stages, or as part of a much larger problem—possibly
considering choices and events that did not actually obtain. A reasonable require-
ment is that, at any stage, the solution is independent of the larger problem it is
embedded in. In this paper, we call this requirement subtree perfectness.
Selten [23] introduced a similar idea for multi-agent extensive form games, called
subgame perfectness. In such games, players decide sequentially, and a player’s
behaviour strategy specifies a decision at each point where he must choose. An
equilibrium point is a strategy for each player, such that no player would change
their strategy if they knew the strategy of all others.
A subgame is a part of a game that is again a game. For example, if a game
consists of four rounds, then after having played two rounds, one can consider the
remaining two rounds as a separate game. An equilibrium point of the full game
of course implies a strategy for each player in the subgame simply by restricting
the strategy of each player in the full game to only that subgame. If, for every
subgame, the restriction of the equilibrium point of the full game to that subgame
also yields an equilibrium point of that subgame, then the equilibrium point of the
full game is called subgame perfect.
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Figure 1. Two-
stage problem.
N2
cake
ice cream
Figure 2. Second stage.
Selten showed that for games with perfect recall, (perfect1) equilibrium points
are subgame perfect [23, p. 39, Thm. 2], that is, they are independent of any larger
game in which they could be embedded.
As mentioned, in this paper we investigate single agent sequential decision mak-
ing modelled by decision trees. Although such problems differ in many ways from
extensive form games, subtree perfectness is clearly analogous to subgame perfect-
ness, as the following example shows.
Consider the decision problem in Fig. 1. In the first stage, the subject chooses
between taking scones, or proceeding to the second stage. In the second stage,
the subject chooses between cake, or ice cream. Suppose the subject prefers to
reject scones and to choose ice cream at the second stage. This strategy induces a
substrategy in the subtree for the second stage: choose ice cream over cake.
But, as with multi-agent games, we can instead consider the subtree for the sec-
ond stage separately, as in Fig. 2. If, in this smaller tree, the subject prefers ice
cream, then his solution is subtree perfect : his solution for the full tree induces a
strategy in the subtree, and this strategy coincides with his solution for the subtree.
If the subject states a difference preference (either no preference, or clear prefer-
ence for cake), then his solution lacks subtree perfectness. So, subtree perfectness
essentially means that the optimal induced strategies in a subtree do not depend
on the full tree in which the subtree is embedded.
Our goal is to determine the conditions under which a theory of choice is subtree
perfect. We consider a very large class of theories of choice, namely any that can
be represented by conditional choice functions on gambles: we merely assume that
for any set of gambles (functions from the possibility space Ω to a set of rewards R;
these generalize random variables, or horse lotteries), and any conditioning event,
the subject can give a non-empty subset of gambles that he considers optimal.
Gambles that are non-optimal would never be selected, and the subject is unable
to express further preference between the optimal ones. Maximizing expected utility
is a simple example of such a choice function.
General choice functions, however, need neither probability nor utility—not even
a preorder. Consequently, we must take care to distinguish clearly between the nor-
mal form and the extensive form of a decision problem (or game). While these forms
are equivalent when maximizing expected utility [20, 1.3.4], their equivalence breaks
down when expected utility is abandoned, as shown by for instance Seidenfeld [21],
Machina [16], and Jaffray [9], among others.
Further, the standard definitions of normal and extensive form are not compat-
ible with many choice functions. The usual extensive form solution for a decision
1Without going into much detail, a perfect equilibrium point is one which is stable under small
perturbations [23, p. 38].
3tree, as given by Raiffa and Schlaifer [20, 1.2.1], involves using backward induction
to replace subtrees with their maximum expected utility. Clearly, this definition is
too restrictive for general choice functions, particularly those who do not correspond
to a total preorder. Therefore, instead, we use the terms normal and extensive form
in a far more general sense, while retaining their core features: the normal form
specifies all actions in all eventualities in advance, whereas the extensive form spec-
ifies actions locally at each decision node.
Our main results start out from the traditional normal form method of listing
all strategies, finding their corresponding gambles, applying a choice function, and
listing all strategies that induce optimal gambles. In doing so, we assume act-state
independence—that is, choice functions do not depend on the decision. Dropping
act-state independence is beyond the scope of this paper. Under this assumption,
we find three necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to induce
a subtree perfect normal form solution. Further, we show that a normal form
solution induced by a choice function satisfying these conditions will always have
an equivalent extensive form representation. Interestingly, this does not hold for
subtree perfect normal form solutions in general, only those induced by a choice
function.
Our results are very similar to those of Hammond [6], although it may appear
that Hammond’s goal is quite different from ours. Hammond considers extensive
form solutions only, calls them behaviour norms [6, p. 28], and defines a notion
of consistency which corresponds exactly to what we call subtree perfectness for
extensive form solutions. Two trees are called strategically equivalent [16, p. 1636]
if their normal form decisions (or, strategies) induce the same set of gambles. Ham-
mond calls a behaviour norm consequentialist if it preserves strategic equivalence,
that is, if strategically equivalent trees also have strategically equivalent behaviour
norms. Hammond shows that a consistent and consequentialist behaviour norm
implies a choice function on gambles, and then investigates the properties of this
choice function. Although our goal, to find necessary and sufficient conditions on
arbitrary choice functions under which they induce subtree perfect normal form
solutions, is apparently different, Hammond’s approach effectively amounts to the
same thing, but starting from extensive form, and only for a particular class of
choice functions.
Even more so, because, as we will show, subtree perfectness implies normal-
extensive form equivalence, unsurprisingly, Hammond’s necessary and sufficient
conditions on a choice function for it to be implied by a consistent and consequen-
tialist behaviour norm, are very similar to our necessary and sufficient conditions
for subtree perfectness. Hammond’s first condition, that the choice function must
induce a total preorder, is identical to our Property 2. His second, the indepen-
dence axiom, is not present in our work because it only arises if probabilities can be
assigned to certain chance arcs, an assumption we do not make. His third, a type
of sure-thing principle, is very similar to our Property 3, where the difference is
again based on whether or not probabilities are admitted. Finally, our Property 1
is not present in Hammond’s account, because of a small difference in the definition
of decision trees.
Since our study is closely related to Hammond’s work, and makes use of many
similar ideas, we shall throughout note where our definitions and properties coincide
with those of Hammond, and also discuss the implications of the differences in
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approach. It turns out that the only significant difference is dependent upon exactly
how consequentialism is defined. Hammond writes a description of consequentialism
that turns out to be essentially identical to our approach, but his mathematical
definition that he uses in all proofs is actually a weaker version, with which one
cannot prove results quite as strong as ours. In Theorem 37, we unify our work
with Hammond’s informal but strong definition.
Subtree perfectness also relates to Machina’s [16, p. 1627] concept of separability
over mutually exclusive events, which essentially boils down to subtree perfectness
for probability trees. Although Machina defines separability using probabilities and
a total preorder, it can be easily generalized for arbitrary choice functions and more
general gambles that do not involve probabilities. All such possible generalizations
seem to be equivalent to, or implied by, our Property 3.
A different concept called separability is defined by McClennen [17, p. 122]. Un-
der the assumption of dynamic consistency [17, p. 120], this form of separability
proves to be equivalent to subtree perfectness. The condition of dynamic consis-
tency is implicitly assumed in our solutions. Although once again McClennen’s
decision trees are somewhat different from ours, his Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 are very
similar to our Lemma 21, and indeed the decision trees used in the proofs are almost
identical.
Subtree perfectness is strongly linked to backward induction methods for solv-
ing decision trees. Indeed, under a total preorder, failures of backward induction
are often used to illustrate violations of subtree perfectness [11, 16]. We find that
subtree perfectness is sufficient, but, perhaps surprisingly, not necessary, for back-
ward induction to work. In particular, a total preorder is not required. Further,
backward induction implies a weaker form of subtree perfectness, in which every
strategy must induce an optimal substrategy in every subtree, but the set of opti-
mal strategies is not required to induce the set of all optimal substrategies in every
subtree.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains decision trees and intro-
duces notation. Section 3 provides a careful definition of normal and extensive form
solutions, and introduces the concept of gambles to more easily work with normal
form solutions. Section 4 introduces choice functions and their relationship with
normal form solutions. Section 5 defines subtree perfectness and contains the prin-
cipal results. Section 6 explores when a backward induction method can be used
to find the normal form solution induced by a choice function. Section 7 examines
the relationships subtree perfectness has with backward induction, extensive form
equivalence, and the ideas of Hammond, McClennen, and Machina.
2. Decision Trees
In this section, we explain the basic ideas behind decision trees and notation
which will be used throughout the rest of the paper. For more information about
decision trees, we refer to the literature [14, 3].
2.1. Definition and Example. A decision tree consists of a rooted tree [5, p. 92,
Sec. 3.2] of decision nodes, chance nodes, and reward leaves, growing from left to
right. The left hand side corresponds to what happens first, and the right hand
side to what happens last. The payoffs for each sequence of decisions and events
are at the end.
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Figure 3. Payoff table and decision tree for walking in the lake district.
Consider the following example. Tomorrow, a subject is going for a walk in
the lake district. It may rain (E1), or not (E2). The subject can either take a
waterproof (d1), or not (d2), and can also choose to buy today’s newspaper to
learn tomorrow’s weather forecast (dS), or not (dS). Suppose that the forecast can
have either two outcomes: predicting rain (S1), or not (S2). The utility of each
combination, if the subject does not buy the newspaper, is summarized in Figure 3
(left). If the subject buys the newspaper, then one utile is subtracted.
Figure 3 also depicts the decision tree. Squares are decision nodes, and circles
are chance nodes. From each node, branches emerge. For decision nodes, these are
decisions; for chance nodes, these are events. For each chance node, the events form
a partition of the possibility space, contrary to Hammond [6, p. 31], where events
at chance nodes form a partition of the set of all states of nature still possible
upon reaching the chance node. This leads to several technical differences, that
will be seen in Definition 8, Property 1, and Property 7. Furthermore, our chance
nodes are called natural nodes by Hammond. Hammond’s chance nodes involve
probabilities and do not appear in our decision trees.
In our example, the subject must first decide whether to buy the newspaper or
not, hence we start with a decision node. If he buys the newspaper (dS), then
he learns about tomorrow’s forecast. Thus, the chance node following dS has two
branches, forecasting rain (S1), or no rain (S2). Next, when leaving for the trip, he
can either bring his waterproof (d1) or not (d2), hence the decision node following
S1. During the walk, a chance node yields rain (E1) or not (E2).
So, each path in a decision tree amounts to a particular sequence of decisions
and events. The payoffs resulting from each such sequence are put at the end.
2.2. Notation. Before elaborating how decision trees can be solved, we introduce
a convenient mathematical notation for them. Decision trees can be seen as com-
binations of smaller decision trees: for instance, in the lake district example, one
could draw the subtree corresponding to buying the newspaper, and also draw the
subtree corresponding to making an immediate decision. The decision tree for the
full problem is then formed by joining these two subtrees at a decision node.
Hence, we can represent a decision tree as follows. Let T1, . . . , Tn be decision
trees and E1, . . . , En be a partition of the possibility space. If T is formed by
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combining the trees at a decision node, we write
T =
n⊔
i=1
Ti.
If T is formed by combining the trees at a chance node, with subtree Ti being
connected by event Ei , we write
T =
n⊙
i=1
EiTi.
For instance, for the tree of Fig. 3, we write
(S1(T1 ⊔ T2)⊙ S2(T1 ⊔ T2)) ⊔ (U1 ⊔ U2)
with
T1 = E19⊙ E214 U1 = E110⊙ E215 T2 = E14⊙ E219 U2 = E15⊙ E220
In certain circumstances it will be necessary to consider decision trees formed by
adding a decision node in front of a tree T , that is, a decision tree whose root is a
decision node with one option. Such a tree shall be denoted by ⊔T .
In this paper we shall often be considering subtrees of larger trees. For subtrees,
we need to know the events that were observed in the past. Two subtrees with
the same configuration of nodes and arcs may have different preceding events, and
should be treated differently. Therefore we associate with every decision tree T an
event ev(T ): the intersection of all the events on chance arcs that have preceded
T . Hammond [6, p. 27] denotes these events by S(n).
Definition 1. A subtree of a tree T obtained by removal of all non-descendants of
a particular node N is called the subtree of T at N and is denoted by stN (T ).
Subtrees are called continuation trees by Hammond [6].
3. Solving Decision Trees
This paper deals with more general solutions of decision trees than are usually
considered. Consequently, the usual definitions of extensive and normal forms, such
as in Raiffa and Schlaifer [20], are insufficient. Therefore, we first carefully define
normal and extensive form solutions.
3.1. Extensive and Normal Form Solutions. The usual definition of extensive
form is based on backward induction and expected utility. At each ultimate decision
node, we calculate the expected utility of each option, and choose a maximal arc,
replacing that node by its maximum expected utility. The penultimate decision
nodes have now become the ultimate ones, so we can repeat this process, until the
root node.
If options are not assigned values, then this type of backward induction cannot
be used. Therefore, we abandon the link with backward induction, and instead
focus on another property of extensive form: the decision arc to follow only needs
to be specified when the subject actually reaches the decision node.
An extensive form solution of a decision tree removes from each decision node
some (possibly none), but not all, of the decision arcs. So, an extensive form
solution is a subtree of the original decision tree, where at each decision node a
non-empty subset of arcs is retained. For instance, in the lake district example,
7one of the extensive form solutions is: do not buy the newspaper, and then either
take the waterproof or not. An extensive form solution can be used as follows: the
subject, upon reaching a decision node, chooses one of the arcs in the extensive
form solution, and follows it. The subject only needs to decide which arc to follow
at a decision node when reaching that node.
In contrast, normal form solutions specify all future decisions at the start, so
no further decisions need to be taken as time progresses. Classically, normal form
solutions involve listing all possible combinations of actions and then choosing one
to maximize expected utility. This generalizes as follows.
First, an extensive form solution with just one arc out of each decision node,
is called a normal form decision. For instance, in the example, one of the normal
form decisions is: buy the newspaper, and take the waterproof if the newspaper
predicts rain, but do not take the waterproof otherwise. We denote the set of all
normal form decisions for a decision tree T by nfd(T ). Normal form decisions are
also called strategies, pure strategies, plans, and policies.
A normal form solution of a decision tree T is then simply a subset of nfd(T ).
The interpretation of this subset is that the subject picks one of the normal form
decisions of the normal form solution, and then acts accordingly.
It is natural to ask whether solutions of one form can be meaningfully trans-
formed into solutions of the other. This question is addressed in Section 7.2. For
now, note only that there are usually more normal form solutions than there are ex-
tensive form solutions. For example, consider the tree below,
r11
d
1
1
r12d1
2
r21
d
2
1
r22d2
2
and suppose a normal form solution contains two normal form
decisions, namely d11d
2
2 and d
1
2d
2
1. Any attempt to find a cor-
responding extensive form solution will have to include all four
decision arcs, but that would also correspond to the normal form
solution where all four normal form decisions are present. There-
fore there is no one-to-one correspondence between extensive and
normal form solutions.
These two forms of solution are not the only possibilities. For instance, McClen-
nen [17] considers a form of solution where the subject must give a set of optimal
normal form decisions at every node in the tree. The interpretation is apparently
that the subject chooses a plan every time he reaches a node. We shall call such
a solution a dynamic normal form solution. Our normal form solutions are special
cases of dynamic normal form solutions, where the plan at any node is simply the
restriction, to the node in question, of the plan at the root node (McClennen calls
this a dynamically consistent solution).
3.2. Extensive and Normal Form Operators. An extensive form operator is
a function which maps each decision tree to an extensive form solution of that
decision tree. The method by which decision arcs are removed is not specified, and
in particular, need not be related to backward induction. Hammond [6, p. 28] calls
these operators behaviour norms.
A normal form operator maps each decision tree to a normal form solution of
that tree. Again, the method by which this happens is not part of our definition.
These operators are usually interpreted as describing optimality.
Clearly, the classical extensive and normal form interpretations are, respectively,
extensive and normal form operators. Classical backward induction deletes any arc
with non-maximal expectation, and results in a tree with some arcs deleted: an
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ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
E19⊕ E214 9 9 14 14
S1 (E19⊕ E214) ⊕ S2 (E14⊕ E219) 9 4 14 19
Table 1. Example of normal form gambles.
extensive form solution. The classical normal form finds the set of normal form
decisions with maximal expectation: a normal form solution.
3.3. Gambles. To express normal form decisions and solutions efficiently, we first
introduce some definitions and notation. Let Ω be the possibility space: the set of
all possible states of the world. We only consider finite possibility spaces. Elements
of Ω are called typically denoted by ω. Subsets of Ω are called events. Let R be a
set of rewards. For our results we need not assume R = R.
A gamble is a function X : Ω → R, and is interpreted as an uncertain reward:
once ω ∈ Ω is observed, X yields X(ω). Probabilities over Ω are not needed.
3.4. Normal Form Gambles. Once a normal form decision is chosen, the reward
is determined entirely by the events that obtain. So, every normal form decision
has a corresponding gamble, which we call a normal form gamble. The set of all
normal form gambles associated with a decision tree T is denoted by gamb(T ).
Using Fig. 3, we explain how to find normal form gambles. First consider the
subtree at N1
1
1, which has normal form decisions d1 and d2. The former gives
reward 9 utiles if ω ∈ E1 and 14 utiles if ω ∈ E2, and so yields the gamble
(1) E19⊕ E214.
The ⊕ operator combines partial maps defined on disjoint domains (i.e. the partial
map E19 defined on E1, and the partial map E214 defined on E2).
Now consider the subtree with root at N1
1, and in particular the normal form
decision ‘d1 if S1 and d2 if S2’. This gives reward 9 if ω ∈ S1 ∩ E1, reward 14 if
ω ∈ S1 ∩ E2, and so on. The corresponding gamble is
(S1 ∩E1)9⊕ (S1 ∩ E2)14⊕ (S2 ∩ E1)4 ⊕ (S2 ∩E2)19,
or briefly, if we omit ‘∩’ and employ distributivity,
(2) S1 (E19⊕ E214)⊕ S2 (E14⊕ E219) ,
where multiplication with an event is now understood to correspond to restriction,
i.e., 9 is a constant map on Ω, E19 is a constant map restricted to E1, and S1(E19)
is obtained from E19 by further restriction to E1∩S1. For illustration, we tabulate
the values of some normal form gambles in Table 1, where Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4},
E1 = {ω1, ω2}, and S1 = {ω1, ω3}.
Observe that the gamble in Eq. (2) incorporates the gamble in Eq. (1). This
observation allows a very convenient recursive definition of the gamb operator.
Definition 2. For any events E1, . . . , En which form a partition, and any finite
family of sets of gambles X1, . . . , Xn, we define the following set of gambles:
(3)
n⊕
i=1
EiXi =
{
n⊕
i=1
EiXi : Xi ∈ Xi
}
9Definition 3. With any decision tree T , we associate a set of gambles gamb(T ),
recursively defined through:
• If a tree T consists of only a leaf with reward r ∈ R, then
(4a) gamb(T ) = {r}.
• If a tree T has a chance node as root, that is, T =
⊙n
i=1EiTi, then
(4b) gamb
(
n⊙
i=1
EiTi
)
=
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ti).
• If a tree T has a decision node as root, that is, if T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti, then
(4c) gamb
(
n⊔
i=1
Ti
)
=
n⋃
i=1
gamb(Ti).
It is easy to show that this definition gives indeed the required set,
(5) gamb(T ) =
⋃
U∈nfd(T )
gamb(U).
Hammond uses F (T, n) for gamb(stN (T )). McClennen uses G(T ) for gamb(T ).
Multiple decision trees can model the same problem. This suggests the following
definition (see for instance [12, 16]):
Definition 4. Two decision trees T1 and T2 are called strategically equivalent if
gamb(T1) = gamb(T2).
Hammond [6, p. 38] uses the term consequentially equivalent.
4. Normal Form Solutions for Decision Trees
4.1. Choice Functions and Optimality. We defined a normal form solution as
a subset of all normal form decisions. Ideally one would like to identify a single
best normal form decision, but this is not always possible. The subject might,
however, still be able to eliminate some normal form decisions that he would never
consider choosing, leaving a subset of normal form decisions. We say that the
subject considers these as optimal.
In classical decision theory, each normal form decision induces a random real-
valued gain, and is considered optimal if its expected gain is maximized. As another
example, suppose that a set M of plausible probability distributions are specified.
Then the subject might consider optimal all normal form decisions whose expected
gain is maximal under at least one distribution in M.
So, often, optimal decisions are determined by comparison of gambles. We follow
this common approach, since normal form decisions have corresponding gambles,
and gambles are easier to work with. We therefore suppose that the subject can
determine an optimal subset of any set of gambles, conditional upon an event A
(corresponding to ev(T ) of the tree T in question):
Definition 5. A choice function opt maps, for any non-empty event A, each non-
empty finite set X of gambles to a non-empty subset of this set:
∅ 6= opt(X|A) ⊆ X .
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Note that common uses of choice functions in social choice theory, such as by
Sen [24, p. 63, ll. 19–21] do not consider conditioning, and define choice functions
for arbitrary sets of options (not for gambles only).
4.2. Normal Form Operator Induced by a Choice Function. Now, given a
choice function opt, we naturally arrive at a normal form operator normopt, simply
by applying opt on the set of all gambles associated with the tree T and then finding
the corresponding set of normal form decisions.
Definition 6. Given any choice function opt, and any decision tree T with ev(T ) 6=
∅, we define
normopt(T ) = {U ∈ nfd(T ) : gamb(U) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T ))}.
Of course, since the U are normal form decisions, gamb(U) is always a singleton
in this definition. In particular, the following important equality holds,
(6) gamb(normopt(T )) = opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )).
It follows immediately that normopt respects strategic equivalence:
Theorem 7. If T1 and T2 are strategically equivalent and ev(T1) = ev(T2) 6= ∅,
then gamb(normopt(T1)) = gamb(normopt(T2)).
This is of course an attractive property, as there are always many strategically
equivalent trees representing the same problem: Theorem 7 guarantees that all
equivalent representations yield the same solution.
When studying subtree perfectness, we consider normopt for arbitrary subtrees.
To ensure that normopt can be applied on each of these, we need:
Definition 8. A decision tree T is called consistent if for every node N of T ,
ev(stN (T )) 6= ∅.
Clearly, if a decision tree T is consistent, then for any node N in T , stN (T )
is also consistent. We study only consistent decision trees because we consider
normopt(stN (T )) for any node N in T , which is impossible when ev(stN (T )) = ∅.
Usually, one does not consider events which conflict with preceding events, hence
consistency is satisfied. However, due to an oversight, some branch of a chance
node might represent an event that cannot occur: such tree can always be made
consistent by removing those nodes whose conditioning event is empty.
Not all sets of gambles can be represented by a consistent decision tree:
Definition 9. Let A be any non-empty event, and let X be a non-empty finite set
of gambles. Then the following conditions are equivalent; if any (hence all) of them
are satisfied, we say that X is A-consistent.
(A) There is a consistent decision tree T with ev(T ) = A and gamb(T ) = X .
(B) For every r ∈ R and every X ∈ X such that X−1(r) 6= ∅, it holds that
X−1(r) ∩A 6= ∅.
We will also say that a gamble X is A-consistent whenever {X} is A-consistent.
5. Subtree Perfectness
We now define subtree perfectness, for both types of operator, and find necessary
and sufficient conditions on opt for normopt to be subtree perfect.
11
T stN (T )
ext(stN (T ))
optimise
restrict
ext(T ) stN (ext(T ))
restrict
optimise
if N in ext(T )
Figure 4. For a subtree perfect extensive form operator, opti-
mization and restriction commute.
5.1. Example and Definition. First, we illustrate subtree perfectness by an ex-
ample. Suppose we apply an extensive form operator to the tree T in Fig. 3. This
operator will delete some (possibly none) of the decision arcs at N = N1
1
1. If the
operator would delete the same arcs at N regardless of the larger tree in which
stN (T ) is embedded, then the operator is subtree perfect. If the operator does not
have this property (for instance, if the solution of T after N were to depend on con-
sequences of dS or S2), then it fails subtree perfectness. Hammond [6, p. 34] calls
subtree perfectness for behaviour norms (extensive form operators) consistency.
The definition for subtree perfectness for a normal form operator requires the
following extension to Definition 1.
Definition 10. If T is a set of decision trees and N a node, then
stN (T ) = {stN (T ) : T ∈ T and N in T }.
Definition 11. An extensive form operator ext is called subtree perfect if for every
consistent decision tree T and every node N such that N is in ext(T ),
stN (ext(T )) = ext(stN (T )).
A normal form operator norm is called subtree perfect if for every consistent deci-
sion tree T and every node N which is in at least one element of norm(T ),
stN (norm(T )) = norm(stN (T )).
In other words, for a subtree perfect operator, it does not matter whether we first
restrict to a subtree and then optimize, or first optimize and only then restrict to
the subtree: subtree perfectness means that optimization and restriction commute,
as in Fig. 4.
The extensive form operator extP corresponding to the usual backward induction
using expected utility is well known to be subtree perfect, provided probabilities
at chance nodes are non-zero. Also, the usual normal form operator normP corre-
sponding to maximizing expected utility over all normal form decisions is subtree
perfect, because extP is equivalent to normP .
Not all choice functions are subtree perfect:
Example 12. Let T be the decision tree in Fig. 5, where X, Y , and Z are its normal
form gambles. Under point-wise dominance, X and Y are incomparable, as are Y
and Z. Hence, norm(stN (T )) is {X,Y } (where we conveniently identified normal
form decisions with their normal form gambles). But norm(T ) = opt({X,Y, Z}) =
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Figure 5. Decision tree for Example 12.
{Y, Z} as clearly Z dominates X. Restricting this solution to stN (T ) gives the
normal form solution {Y }. Concluding,
{X,Y } = norm(stN (T )) 6= stN (norm(T )) = {Y }
and therefore the normal form operator induced by opt lacks subtree perfectness.
5.2. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. In this section, we work extensively
with normal form solutions, which are sets of trees. Therefore, we extend gamb, ⊙,
and ⊔, to sets of trees:
Definition 13. For any set of decision trees T , gamb(T ) =
⋃
T∈T gamb(T ).
Definition 14. For any sets of consistent decision trees T1, . . . , Tn, and any
partition E1, . . . , En, let⊙n
i=1 EiTi = {
⊙n
i=1 EiTi : Ti ∈ Ti} ,⊔n
i=1 Ti = {
⊔n
i=1 Ti : Ti ∈ Ti} .
For sets of trees, the gamb operator keeps working as expected:
gamb (
⊙n
i=1EiTi) =
⊕n
i=1 Ei gamb(Ti),(7)
gamb (
⊔n
i=1 Ti) =
⋃n
i=1 gamb(Ti).(8)
One should also observe that gamb(T ) = gamb(nfd(T )).
The next three properties turn out to be necessary and sufficient for subtree
perfectness of normal form operators induced by a choice function.
Property 1 (Conditioning Property). Let A be a non-empty event, and let X
be a non-empty finite A-consistent set of gambles, with {X,Y } ⊆ X such that
AX = AY . If X ∈ opt(X|A), then Y ∈ opt(X|A).
This property is not found in the accounts of Hammond and McClennen, because
their decision trees are different from ours. If their methods were adapted to our
decision trees, then the conditioning property would appear in their work too. The
property is more of a technical detail than an important point, since it states that,
if two gambles are equal on an event, one gamble cannot be preferred to the other
given that event. Such a property would be common and desirable for a choice
function, regardless of its implications for subtree perfectness.
Property 2 (Intersection property). For any event A 6= ∅ and non-empty finite
A-consistent sets of gambles X and Y such that Y ⊆ X and opt(X|A) ∩ Y 6= ∅,
opt(Y|A) = opt(X|A) ∩ Y.
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The intersection property is precisely Arrow’s (C4) [2, p. 123].
For the next property, we use the following extension of the ⊕ notation: if A is
a non-trivial event (non-empty and not Ω), then
AX ⊕AZ = {AX ⊕AZ : X ∈ X}.
Property 3 (Mixture property). For any events A and B such that A ∩ B 6= ∅
and A ∩B 6= ∅, any A ∩B-consistent gamble Z, and any non-empty finite A ∩ B-
consistent set of gambles X ,
opt(AX ⊕AZ|B) = A opt(X|A ∩B)⊕AZ.
This property is a form of the well known independence principle (see for example
[17, p. 44]). It has strongest similarities to McClennen’s independence for choice
[17, p. 57], and Arrow’s conditional preference [1, p. 257].
Property 2 has a many equivalent formulations. The following three give inter-
esting alternative interpretations, and are useful in some of the proofs.
Property 4 (Strong path independence). For any non-empty event A and any
non-empty finite A-consistent sets of gambles X1, . . . ,Xn, there is a non-empty
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
opt
(
n⋃
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
=
⋃
i∈I
opt(Xi|A)
Property 5 (Very strong path independence). For any non-empty event A and
any non-empty finite A-consistent sets of gambles X1, . . . ,Xn,
opt
(
n⋃
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
=
n⋃
i=1
Xi∩opt(∪
n
i=1Xi|A) 6=∅
opt(Xi|A)
Property 6 (Total preorder). For every event A 6= ∅, there is a total preorder A
on A-consistent gambles such that for every non-empty finite set of A-consistent
gambles X ,
opt(X|A) = {X ∈ X : (∀Y ∈ X )(X A Y )}
The total preorder property essentially boils down to Arrow’s (C5), which is also
called the weak axiom of revealed preference [2, p. 123]. More equivalents are given
by Arrow [2, (C1)], Houthakker [7, p. 163], and Ville [25, p. 123].
Lemma 15. Properties 2, 4, 5 and 6 are equivalent.
Proof. Property 6 =⇒ Property 5 =⇒ Property 4 =⇒ Property 2. Immediate.
Property 2 =⇒ Property 6. See Arrow’s (C4)⇐⇒ (C5) [2, p. 124, Thm. 1]. 
To show that Properties 1, 2 and 3 are necessary and sufficient for subtree
perfectness of normopt, we require several lemmas. The proofs are long but mostly
tedious and straightforward, and so are omitted.
For a decision tree T , ch(T ) is the set of child nodes of the root node of T .
Lemma 16. Let norm be any normal form operator. Let T be a consistent decision
tree. If,
(i) for all nodes K ∈ ch(T ) such that K is in at least one element of norm(T ),
stK(norm(T )) = norm(stK(T )),
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(ii) and, for all nodes K ∈ ch(T ), and all nodes L ∈ stK(T ) such that L is in
at least one element of norm(stK(T )),
stL(norm(stK(T ))) = norm(stL(stK(T ))),
then, for all nodes N in T such that N is in at least one element of norm(T ),
stN (norm(T )) = norm(stN (T )).
Lemma 17. Let A1, . . . , An be a finite partition of Ω, and let B be an event such
that Ai ∩ B 6= ∅ for all i. Let X1, . . . , Xn be a finite family of non-empty finite
sets of gambles, where Xi is Ai ∩ B-consistent. If a choice function opt satisfies
Properties 2 and 3, then
(9) opt
(
n⊕
i=1
AiXi
∣∣∣∣∣B
)
=
n⊕
i=1
Ai opt(Xi|Ai ∩B).
Lemma 18. Consider a consistent decision tree T whose root is a decision node,
so T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti, and any choice function opt. For each tree Ti, let Ni be its root.
Then, Ni is in at least one element of normopt(T ) if and only if
(10) gamb(Ti) ∩ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) 6= ∅.
Lemma 19. For any consistent decision tree T =
⊙n
i=1 EiTi, and any choice
function opt satisfying Property 1,
(11) gamb(normopt(T )) =
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(normopt(Ti))
implies
normopt(T ) =
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti).
Lemma 20. For any consistent decision tree T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti and any choice function
opt satisfying Property 2,
(12) gamb(normopt(T )) =
⋃
i∈I
gamb(normopt(Ti))
implies
normopt(T ) = nfd
(⊔
i∈I
normopt(Ti)
)
,
where I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : gamb(Ti) ∩ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) 6= ∅}.
The next lemma shows necessity of Properties 1, 2, and 3 for subtree perfectness.
Interestingly, the proof only involves the two decision trees in Figure 6.
Lemma 21. If normopt is subtree perfect, then opt satisfies Properties 1, 2, and 3.
We are now ready to establish that Properties 1, 2, and 3 are also sufficient for
subtree perfectness.
Theorem 22 (Subtree perfectness theorem). A normal form operator normopt is
subtree perfect if and only if opt satisfies Properties 1, 2 and 3.
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Figure 6. Decision trees for Lemma 21.
Proof. “only if”. See Lemma 21.
“if”. We proceed by structural induction on all possible arguments of normopt,
that is, on all consistent decision trees. In the base step, we prove the implication
for trees consisting of only a single node. In the induction step, we prove that if
the implication holds for the subtrees at every child of the root node, then the
implication also holds for the whole tree.
First, if the decision tree T has only a single node (a reward, and no further
children) then subtree perfectness is trivially satisfied.
Next, suppose that the consistent decision tree T has multiple nodes. Let
{N1, . . . , Nn} = ch(T ) be the children of the root node of T , and let Ti = stNi(T ).
The induction hypothesis is: subtree perfectness holds for all subtrees at every child
of the root node, that is, for all Ti. More precisely, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all
nodes L ∈ Ti which are in at least one element of normopt(Ti)
stL(normopt(Ti)) = normopt(stL(Ti)).
We must show that
stN (normopt(T )) = normopt(stN (T ))
for all nodes N in T such that N is in at least one element of normopt(T ). By
Lemma 16, and the induction hypothesis, it suffices to prove the above equality
only for N ∈ ch(T ), that is, it suffices to show that
(13) stNi(normopt(T )) = normopt(Ti)
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Ni is in at least one element of normopt(T ).
If T has a chance node as its root, that is, T =
⊙n
i=1EiTi, then all Ni are
actually in every element of normopt(T ), so we must simply establish Eq. (13) for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Observe that, if we can establish
(14) normopt(T ) =
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti),
then Eq. (13) follows immediately. Indeed, by Eq. (6),
gamb(normopt(T )) = opt(gamb(T )|ev(T ))
and by the definition of the gamb operator, Eq. (4b) in particular,
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
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and so by Lemma 17,
=
n⊕
i=1
Ei opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T ) ∩Ei )
so, since ev(T ) ∩ Ei = ev(Ti), and again by Eq. (6),
=
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(normopt(Ti))
Whence, Eq. (14) follows by Lemma 19.
Finally, assume that T has a decision node as its root, that is, T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti. Let
I be the subset of {1, . . . , n} such that i ∈ I if and only if Ni is in at least one
element of normopt(T ). We must establish Eq. (13) for all i ∈ I. Equivalently, we
must show that
(15) normopt(T ) = nfd
(⊔
i∈I
normopt(Ti)
)
.
Indeed, by Eq. (6),
gamb(normopt(T )) = opt(gamb(T )|ev(T ))
and by the definition of the gamb operator, Eq. (4c) in particular,
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
gamb(Ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
and so by Property 5,
=
⋃
i∈I∗
opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T )),
where I∗ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : gamb(Ti) ∩ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) 6= ∅}, and so because
ev(T ) = ev(Ti), and again by Eq. (6),
=
⋃
i∈I∗
gamb(normopt(Ti)).
Hence, the conditions of Lemma 20 are satisfied, and I∗ = I by Lemma 18, so
Eq. (15) is established. 
6. Backward Induction
Although Selten’s [23] definition of subgame perfectness does not explicitly refer
to backward induction, one of its aims is unmistakably to identify when a game’s
equilibrium point can be found by backward induction. In fact, when maximizing
expected utility, as in Selten’s work, there seems little reason to distinguish be-
tween subtree perfectness and backward induction because the optimal decisions
are essentially unique: multiple optimal decisions will have the same expectation,
so it suffices to consider only a single representative.
However, if our concept of choice has no reference to expectation, multiple opti-
mal decisions are not necessarily equivalent in any sense. Consequently, backward
induction does not need to be tied to subtree perfectness.
17
Therefore, elsewhere [8], we suggested the following backward induction method,
which generalizes classical backward induction to arbitrary choice functions, and
which is useful when gamb(T ) is very large and applying opt in one go is not
feasible. We first extend normopt to act on sets of decision trees.
Definition 23. Given a choice function opt and any set T of consistent decision
trees, where ev(T ) = A for all T ∈ T ,
normopt(T ) = {U ∈ nfd(T ) : gamb(U) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|A)}.
The goal of our backward induction algorithm is to reach a normal form solution
of T by finding normal form solutions of subtrees of T , and using these solutions
to remove some elements of gamb(T ) before applying opt:
Definition 24. The normal form operator backopt is defined for any consistent
decision tree T through:
• If T consists of only a leaf with reward r ∈ R, then
(16a) backopt(T ) = {T }.
• If T has a chance node as root, that is, T =
⊙n
i=1 EiTi, then
(16b) backopt
(
n⊙
i=1
EiTi
)
= normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei backopt (Ti)
)
• If T has a decision node as root, that is, if T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti, then
(16c) backopt
(
n⊔
i=1
Ti
)
= normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
backopt(Ti)
)
.
This algorithm is almost identical to that suggested by Kikuti et al. [10]: they
apply opt only at decision nodes, whereas we apply opt at all type of node.
It is instructive to compare the definition of the gamb operator (Definition 3)
with Definition 24. The main difference is that backopt inserts normopt at every
stage, to remove as many normal form decisions as possible, early on.
If backopt = normopt, we can use the former as an efficient way of calculating
the latter. Of course, this only works if a normal form gamble that is non-optimal
in a subtree at a node cannot be part of an optimal gamble in the full tree. It is
well known that choice functions exist for which this property does not hold: for
examples, see LaValle and Wapman [11], Jaffray [9], and Seidenfeld [22]. In such
cases, there exist trees such that backopt(T ) 6= normopt(T ).
The following four properties are necessary and sufficient for backopt to coincide
with normopt.
Property 7 (Backward conditioning property). Let A and B be events such that
A ∩B 6= ∅ and A ∩B 6= ∅, and let X be a non-empty finite A ∩B-consistent set of
gambles, with {X,Y } ⊆ X such that AX = AY . Then X ∈ opt(X|A ∩B) implies
Y ∈ opt(X|A ∩ B) whenever there is a non-empty finite A ∩ B-consistent set of
gambles Z such that, for at least one Z ∈ Z,
AX ⊕AZ ∈ opt(AX ⊕AZ|B).
This is clearly just a minor relaxation of Property 1.
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Property 8 (Insensitivity of optimality to the omission of non-optimal elements).
For any event A 6= ∅, and any non-empty finite A-consistent sets of gambles X and
Y,
opt(X|A) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒ opt(Y|A) = opt(X|A).
If opt satisfies this property, then removing non-optimal elements from a set does
not affect whether or not each of the remaining elements is optimal. The property
is called ‘insensitivity to the omission of non-optimal elements’ by De Cooman and
Troffaes [4], and ‘property ǫ’ by Sen [24] who attributes this designation to Douglas
Blair.
Property 9 (Preservation of non-optimality under the addition of elements). For
any event A 6= ∅, and any non-empty finite A-consistent sets of gambles X and Y,
Y ⊆ X ⇒ opt(Y|A) ⊇ opt(X|A) ∩ Y.
This is ‘property α’ in Sen [24], Axiom 7 in Luce and Raiffa [15, p. 288], and
‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ in Radner and Marschak [19].
Property 10 (Backward mixture property). For any events A and B such that
B ∩ A 6= ∅ and B ∩ A 6= ∅, any B ∩ A-consistent gamble Z, and any non-empty
finite B ∩ A-consistent set of gambles X ,
opt
(
AX ⊕AZ|B
)
⊆ A opt(X|A ∩B)⊕AZ.
This is an “inclusion-only” version of Property 3. We do not need the full
property because backward induction moves from right to left.
The proof of the following theorem is, up to obvious details, identical to the
proof of Theorem 22, and is therefore left as an amusing exercise to the reader.
Theorem 25 (Backward induction theorem). A normal form operator normopt
satisfies backward induction (that is, backopt(T ) = normopt(T ) for every consistent
decision tree T ) if and only if opt satisfies Properties 7, 8, 9, and 10.
If backopt(T ) = normopt(T ) for any consistent T , then, at decision nodes, backopt(T )
coincides with the method of Kikuti et al. [10].
7. Discussion
7.1. Relationship Between Subtree Perfectness and Backward Induction.
Obviously, Property 1 implies Property 7, and Property 3 implies Property 10. Also,
it is easily shown that:
Lemma 26. Property 2 implies Properties 8 and 9.
Corollary 27. If normopt is subtree perfect, then normopt = backopt.
Subtree perfectness is, however, not necessary for backward induction. For ex-
ample, point-wise dominance satisfies Properties 1, 8, 9, and 10, but as we saw in
Example 12, it lacks subtree perfectness.
Backward induction does imply a weaker form of subtree perfectness. Suppose
backopt(T ) = normopt(T ) for all consistent decision trees. By definition of backopt,
for any node N that is in at least one element of backopt(T ) we have
stN (normopt(T )) = stN (backopt(T )) ⊆ backopt(stN (T )) = normopt(stN (T )).
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Why can this be seen as a type of subtree perfectness? A subgame perfect
equilibrium point is one that induces an equilibrium point in all subgames. A
subtree perfect normal form operator is one that induces its normal form solution
in all subtrees. Theorem 25 implies every optimal normal form decision induces an
optimal normal form decision in any subtree. So although we do not have subtree
perfectness of solutions we do have subtree perfectness of decisions.
Definition 28. norm is subtree perfect for normal form decisions if for every N
in T such that N is in at least one element of norm(T ),
stN (norm(T )) ⊆ norm(stN (T )).
Obviously, backward induction implies subtree perfectness for normal form de-
cisions. But, the opposite implication does not hold: Property 8 is not necessary
for subtree perfectness for normal form decisions.
Theorem 29. For any choice function opt, normopt is subtree perfect for normal
form decisions if and only if opt satisfies Properties 7, 9, and 10.
7.2. Normal Form and Extensive Form Equivalence. Extensive form solu-
tions can be seen as more natural solutions to decision trees, because they represent
the sequential nature of the decision making, whereas the normal form solutions
remove the sequential aspects. It is common to ask whether there is an equiva-
lence between certain normal form operators and extensive form operators. For our
definitions of normal and extensive form, this is very different from the of “nor-
mal form/extensive form coincidence” of McClennen [17, p. 115]. In McClennen’s
terms, the normal form and extensive form refer to the structure of the tree, and
coincidence requires the solution of the two forms to be the same. In the case of
normopt, this coincidence will always occur by definition.
The clearest equivalence arises when norm(T ) = {ext(T )}, that is, when the
extensive form solution is itself a normal form decision, and is also the only element
of the normal form solution. Even when using choice functions corresponding to
total preorders, this may not arise for every decision tree, so a more general concept
of equivalence is required. We shall consider an extensive form operator and a
normal form operator to be equivalent if, for every consistent decision tree T ,
norm(T ) = nfd(ext(T )).
If such an equivalence holds, it is easy to move from the extensive form solution to
the normal form solution, simply by finding all normal form decisions. It is also
easy to move from the normal form to extensive form, as the following result shows.
Lemma 30. Suppose norm and ext are equivalent. Then a node N is in ext(T ) if
and only if N is in at least one element of norm(T ).
If we can find equivalent normal form and extensive form operators, then either
both are subtree perfect, or neither is.
Lemma 31. Suppose that ext and norm are equivalent. Then, norm is subtree
perfect if and only if ext is subtree perfect.
With these results at hand, normal-extensive form equivalence is easily estab-
lished, using structural induction as usual (the proof is left to the reader):
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Theorem 32. If a normal form operator normopt induced by a choice function
opt is subtree perfect, then there exists an equivalent subtree perfect extensive form
operator ext.
Perhaps surprisingly, there are subtree perfect normal form operators (necessarily
not induced by a choice function) which have no equivalent extensive form operator.
Indeed, the proof of Theorem 32 relies on the following consequence of Lemmas 17
and 19:
normopt (
⊙n
i=1 EiTi) =
⊙n
i=1 Ei normopt(Ti),
General subtree perfect normal form operators need not satisfy this. For instance,
the example of Section 3.1 can yield a subtree perfect normal form operator which
has no equivalent extensive form representation.
7.3. Related Work. As mentioned earlier, our results have strong links with the
work of Hammond [6], Machina [16], and McClennen [17].
Machina [16] assumes probabilities at chance nodes and choice functions that
correspond to total preorders. Under these assumptions, a necessary condition
for subtree perfectness of normopt is that opt satisfies separability over mutually
exclusive events. Consider n possible events with probabilities p1, . . . , pn, a gamble
giving reward ri ∈ R if event i obtains, and a second gamble that gives reward ri
if event i occurs for i > 1 and r∗ ∈ R for i = 1. Separability says that the second
gamble is preferred to the first if and only if r∗ is preferred to r1.
There are various ways to adapt separability for our more general setting. For
example, consider a non-trivial event A and gambles X and Y such that AX = AY ,
AX = Ar1, and AY = Ar2 for some rewards r1 and r2 ∈ R. Separability could
be: opt({X,Y }) = {X} if and only if opt({r1, r2}) = {r1}. Note that Property 3
implies this. Indeed, Property 3 can be seen as a strong form of separability, for it
implies every reasonable generalization of separability.
As already noted, Hammond’s [6] results are slightly different from ours due
to the definition of decision trees, and whether gambles involving probabilities are
admitted. If such details are dealt with, then his results become very similar to
ours. Using our terminology and notation, Hammond’s first defines:
Definition 33. An extensive form operator ext is consistent if it is subtree perfect.
Definition 34. An extensive form operator ext is consequentialist if, for any de-
cision trees T1 and T2 such that gamb(T1) = gamb(T2) and ev(T1) = ev(T2),
gamb(ext(T1)) = gamb(ext(T2)).
Definition 35. An extensive form operator ext is strongly consequentialist if it
is consequentialist and, for any U ∈ nfd(T ) such that gamb(U) ⊆ gamb(ext(T )),
U ∈ nfd(ext(T )).
Note that Hammond does not use the term “strongly consequentialist”. He
writes that consequentialism means that decisions should be valued by their gam-
bles, which corresponds to strong consequentialism. Yet, his only mathematical
definition of consequentialism seems to be identical to Definition 34. The difference
is small, but important to link our results with his.
Hammond argues that consistent and (not necessarily strongly) consequentialist
extensive form operators induce a choice function on gambles as follows.
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Definition 36. For a consistent and consequentialist extensive form operator ext,
define its corresponding choice function optext by
optext(X|A) = gamb(ext(T )),
where T is any consistent decision tree with gamb(T ) = X and ev(T ) = A. Be-
cause ext is consistent and consequentialist, this choice function exists and does not
depend on the choice of T .
With these definitions, we can prove a slightly stronger version of Hammond’s
results [6, Theorem 5.4, Theorem 6, Theorem 7, and Theorem 8].
Theorem 37. A choice function opt satisfies Properties 1, 2, and 3 if and only if
there is a consistent and strongly consequentialist extensive form operator ext such
that optext = opt.
Proof. “if”. Follow the approach of Hammond [6, Theorem 5.4 and Theorem 7].
Note that these proofs require only consequentialism.
“only if”. Suppose opt satisfies Properties 1, 2, and 3. By Theorems 22 and 32,
normopt is subtree perfect and has an equivalent subtree perfect extensive form
operator ext. By definition of normopt, for any strategically equivalent trees T1
and T2, gamb(normopt(T1)) = gamb(normopt(T2)), and so the same holds for ext.
Hence, ext is consistent and consequentialist. By construction, ext is also strongly
consequentialist, and obviously also optext = opt. 
It is easily seen that, for a particular choice function opt, there is exactly one
consistent and strongly consequentialist extensive form operator that induces opt.
Therefore, there is an equivalence between the consistent and strongly consequen-
tialist extensive form operator inducing opt and the subtree perfect normal form
operator induced by opt. This equivalence is not present in Hammond’s account,
since multiple consistent and (not strongly) consequentialist extensive form opera-
tors can induce the same choice function.
For example, if T has two normal form decisions inducing the same gamble X ,
nfd(ext1(T )) could only include one, while nfd(ext2(T )) includes both, without vio-
lating subtree perfectness. Moreover, gamb(T ) contains X so strategic equivalence
is preserved as required. Hence, both operators can be consistent and consequen-
tialist, however only at most one of these can be equivalent to normopt. Indeed, a
consistent and consequentialist extensive form operator can only be equivalent to
its corresponding normopt if it is strongly consequentialist.
As with Hammond, McClennen’s [17] decision trees differ in that some chance
nodes can have probabilities for events. Also, there seems to be no concept of
conditioning in McClennen’s account. As noted in Section 3, McClennen’s dynamic
normal form solutions are more general types of normal form solutions. Some of
his results [17, Theorems 8.1 and 8.2] are similar to ours, and are based on three
restrictions placed on his solutions.
Definition 38 (McClennen, [17, p. 120]). A dynamic normal form solution satisfies
dynamic consistency if, for every node N in the tree, the restriction of the optimal
set at the root node to N is exactly the optimal set at N .
Obviously, there is a one-to-one correspondence between dynamic normal form
solutions satisfying dynamic consistency, and our normal form solutions.
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Definition 39 (McClennen,[17, p. 114]). A dynamic normal form solution satisfies
plan reduction if, for every normal form decision in T that induces the same gamble,
either all or none of them are optimal.
By definition, normopt satisfies plan reduction.
Definition 40 (McClennen,[17, p. 122]). A dynamic normal form solution satisfies
separability if, for any tree T and any node N in T , the set of optimal plans at N
is the same as the set of optimal plans of the separate tree stN(T ).
On its own, separability is not exactly subtree perfectness, but if dynamic con-
sistency holds then the two properties are equivalent. McClennen’s two theorems
can then be adapted into our setting as:
Theorem 41. If a dynamic normal form solution satisfies plan reduction, dynamic
consistency, and separability, then then it coincides with normopt for a choice func-
tion opt satisfying Properties 1, 2, and 3.
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 21. 
8. Conclusion
We extended Selten’s idea of subtree perfectness to decision trees, for normal
and extensive for solutions. Subtree perfectness for extensive form solutions is
Hammond’s consistency condition. Subtree perfectness for normal form solutions
is, under the assumption of dynamic consistency, McClennen’s separability. We
found necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to induce a subtree
perfect normal form operator. These turned out to be similar to, but stronger than,
those for backward induction to work. So, even if a normal form operator lacks
subtree perfectness, it may still be possible to find the normal form solution by
backward induction.
While many choice functions satisfy Property 1, Properties 2 and 3 are perhaps
more restrictive than one would like. Is violating subtree perfectness acceptable?
We believe that subtree perfectness is a desirable property and one must think
carefully before abandoning it. On the other hand, if one is attracted to the three
properties for other reasons, then subtree perfectness gives them a strong justifica-
tion, particularly since (at least for Properties 2 and 3) they are much more difficult
to justify in a static setting. Attempts to justify violation of subtree perfectness,
without violating dynamic consistency, have however been made, for example by
Machina [16] and McClennen [17, 9.6].
We recovered the well-known fact that subtree perfectness requires total pre-
ordering. Many choice functions suggested in the literature, such as maximality [26,
Sec. 3.9] and E-admissibility [13], violate total preordering, and hence fail subtree
perfectness. Interestingly, we can easily establish that some of these (particularly,
maximality and E-admissibility) still admit backward induction.
If one is committed to the idea of subtree perfectness but also wishes to use
a choice function that fails Property 2, then the best solution may be to use an
extensive form operator. One can easily define subtree perfect normal form solutions
based on choice functions (but not directly induced as in Definition 6). These,
however, can have unpleasant behaviour such as admitting pointwise dominated
options. It is easier to avoid such behaviour with subtree perfect extensive form
solutions, as proposed for instance by Seidenfeld [21], although Seidenfeld’s idea
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will only work if the choice function can model complete ignorance. Roughly, this
solution is found by backward induction, and when a decision node admits multiple
optimal options, then it is treated as a chance node with complete ignorance about
which of the optimal decisions is chosen.
We have seen that, when using choice functions on gambles, subtree perfectness
is closely related to equivalence between extensive form and normal form operators,
both using our approach of defining an operator based on a choice function, and
Hammond’s approach of defining a choice function based on an operator. Interest-
ingly, normal-extensive form equivalence need not hold for subtree perfect operators
that are not induced by choice functions.
Although we have primarily investigated normopt in this paper, we do not argue
that a normal form operator, and normopt in particular, gives the best solution to
a decision tree. A normal form solution requires a policy for all eventualities to
be specified and adhered to. The subject adheres to this policy only by his own
resolution: he may of course have the ability to change his policy upon reaching a
decision node [21]. One could therefore argue that a normal form solution is only
acceptable for sequential problems when the subject does not get the chance to
change his mind (for example, if he instructs, in advance, others to carry out the
actions).
In practice, applying opt to the set of all normal form gambles may be difficult.
Therefore, we defined a normal form operator which yields a normal form solution
by means of backward induction, and which will, in many cases, be easier to apply
than normopt. We found necessary and sufficient conditions on opt for our backward
induction algorithm to yield exactly normopt. As mentioned, we found that total
preordering is not necessary for backward induction to work: the set of choice
functions that satisfy the backward induction properties are a subset of those that
satisfy subtree perfectness for normal form solutions and a superset of those that
satisfy subtree perfectness. Hence, it remains unclear whether backward induction
has any justification beyond practicality.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Eq. (5).
Lemma 42. For any decision tree T , gamb(T ) = gamb(nfd(T )).
Proof. We prove this by structural induction. In the base step, we prove the equality
for trees comprising only one node. In the induction step, we prove that if the
equality holds for the subtrees at every child of the root node of T , then the equality
also holds for T .
If T consists of only a single node, namely a reward node, then nfd(T ) = {T }
and the result holds trivially. Thus the base step is confirmed.
Suppose T has a chance node at the root, that is, T =
⊙n
i=1 EiTi. Each element
of nfd(T ) is of the form
⊙n
i=1 Ui, where Ui ∈ nfd(Ti). In other words, nfd(T ) is the
set of all possible mixtures of the elements of nfd(Ti), that is,
nfd(T ) =
n⊙
i=1
Ei nfd(Ti).
The induction hypothesis is gamb(Ti) = gamb(nfd(Ti)) for each i. We have
gamb(nfd(T )) = gamb
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei nfd(Ti)
)
=
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(nfd(Ti))
=
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ti)
= gamb(T ).
On the other hand, if T has a decision node as a root, that is, T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti, then
nfd(T ) =
{
⊔ U : U ∈
n⋃
i=1
nfd(Ti)
}
,
and, since gamb(⊔U) = gamb(U) for any U ,
gamb(nfd(T )) =
{
gamb(⊔U) : U ∈
n⋃
i=1
nfd(Ti)
}
=
{
gamb(U) : U ∈
n⋃
i=1
nfd(Ti)
}
=
n⋃
i=1
gamb(nfd(Ti))
and again, the induction hypothesis says that gamb(Ti) = gamb(nfd(Ti)) for each
i, so
=
n⋃
i=1
gamb(Ti)
= gamb(T ).
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This completes the induction step. 
A.2. Equivalence of Definition 9(A) and (B).
Proof of equivalence. (A) =⇒ (B). We prove the implication by structural induc-
tion on the tree T . In the base step, we prove that, for every X and non-empty
event A, the implication holds for consistent decision trees which consist of only a
single node. In the induction step, we prove that if, for all X and non-empty A,
the implication holds for the subtrees at every child of the root node, then, for all
X and non-empty A, the implication also holds for the whole tree.
First, if T consists of only a single node, namely a reward node, then gamb(T ) =
{s} for some s ∈ R, so by assumption, X = gamb(T ) = {X} where X is the gamble
yielding a constant value s. Clearly, X−1(r) = ∅ for all r 6= s and X−1(s) = Ω,
hence indeed X−1(r) ∩ A = A 6= ∅ whenever X−1(r) 6= ∅, and this for every
non-empty event A.
Next, suppose T has a chance node as its root, that is, T =
⊙n
i=1EiTi. By
assumption, and by the definition of gamb (see Definition 3),
X = gamb(T ) =
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ti) =
n⊕
i=1
EiXi
where Xi is a shorthand notation for gamb(Ti). Also, by assumption, ev(T ) = A.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that for every r ∈ R and every Xi ∈ Xi such
that X−1i (r) 6= ∅, it holds that X
−1
i (r)∩A∩Ei 6= ∅ (indeed, ev(Ti) = ev(T )∩Ei =
A ∩ Ei). Now we have all ingredients to prove the desired implication. Indeed, for
any X ∈ X , or equivalently, for any X =
⊕n
i=1EiXi with Xi ∈ Xi,
(17) X−1(r) =
(
n⊕
i=1
EiXi
)−1
(r) =
n⋃
i=1
X−1i (r) ∩ Ei
Hence Eq. (17) implies that X−1(r) 6= ∅ whenever X−1i (r)∩Ei 6= ∅ for at least one
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and in that case, it obviously follows that also X−1i (r) 6= ∅, which
implies, as just shown, that X−1i (r) ∩ A ∩ Ei 6= ∅. But, then, again by Eq. (17), it
must also hold that X−1(r) ∩ A 6= ∅.
Finally, suppose that the root of T is a decision node, that is, T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti. By
assumption, and by the definition of gamb (see Definition 3),
X = gamb(T ) =
n⋃
i=1
gamb(Ti) =
n⋃
i=1
Xi
where Xi is a shorthand notation for gamb(Ti). Also, by assumption, ev(T ) = A.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that for every r ∈ R and every Xi ∈ Xi such
that X−1i (r) 6= ∅, it holds that X
−1
i (r)∩A 6= ∅ (indeed, ev(Ti) = ev(T ) = A). But,
for any X ∈ X , it follows that X = Xi for some Xi ∈ Xi, so the desired implication
follows immediately from the induction hypothesis.
(B) =⇒ (A). Suppose that for every r ∈ R and everyX ∈ X such that X−1(r) 6=
∅, it holds that X−1(r) ∩ A 6= ∅. Consider the decision tree
T =
⊔
X∈X
⊙
r∈R
X−1(r) 6=∅
X−1(r)r
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with ev(T ) = A. Let N(X) denote the chance node of T associated with X , and let
N(X, r) denote the reward node of T associated with X and r (of course N(X, r)
only exists for X−1(r) 6= ∅, by definition of T ).
Clearly, T is consistent, because ev(stN(X)(T )) = ev(T ) = A 6= ∅ and ev(stN(X,r)(T )) =
ev(stN(X)(T )) ∩X
−1(r) = A ∩X−1(r) 6= ∅ by assumption, and
gamb(T ) =
⋃
X∈X
gamb

 ⊙
r∈R
X−1(r) 6=∅
X−1(r)r


=
⋃
X∈X


⊕
r∈R
X−1(r) 6=∅
X−1(r)r

 =
⋃
X∈X
{X} = X
which establishes (A). 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 15.
Proof. In this proof, A is a non-empty event and all gambles are A-consistent.
Property 2 =⇒ Property 5. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be non-empty finite sets of gambles,
and let X =
⋃n
i=1 Xi. If opt(X|A) ∩ Xk 6= ∅, then opt(Xk|A) = opt(X|A) ∩ Xk.
Hence,
opt(X|A) =
n⋃
k=1
opt(X|A) ∩ Xk =
n⋃
k=1
Xk∩opt(X|A) 6=∅
opt(Xk|A)
Property 5 =⇒ Property 4. Immediate.
Property 4 =⇒ Property 6. Define X A Y if X ∈ opt({X,Y }|A). First, we
prove that A is a total preorder (i.e. total, reflexive, and transitive). Clearly,
A is total since X ∈ opt({X,Y }|A) or Y ∈ opt({X,Y }|A), hence X A Y or
Y A X , for all normal form decisions X and Y . Obviously, A is reflexive. Is A
transitive? Suppose X A Y and Y A Z.
By Property 4,
opt({X,Y, Z}|A) =


opt({Y, Z}|A), or
{X}, or
opt({Y, Z}|A) ∪ {X}.
Since, Y A Z, it follows that {X,Y } ∩ opt({X,Y, Z}|A) 6= ∅.
Again, by Property 4,
opt({X,Y, Z}|A) =


opt({X,Y }|A), or
{Z}, or
opt({X,Y }|A) ∪ {Z}.
The case opt({X,Y, Z}|A) = {Z} cannot occur however, because we just showed
that {X,Y }∩ opt({X,Y, Z}|A) 6= ∅. Hence, because X ∈ opt({X,Y }|A), it follows
that X ∈ opt({X,Y, Z}|A).
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Once more by Property 4,
opt({X,Y, Z}|A) =


opt({X,Z}|A), or
{Y }, or
opt({X,Z}|A) ∪ {Y }.
We just showed that X ∈ opt({X,Y, Z}|A), hence the second case cannot occur,
and it can only be that also X ∈ opt({X,Z}|A), establishing X A Z.
Finally, we prove that
opt(X|A) = {X ∈ X : (∀Y ∈ X )(X A Y )},
or equivalently, we prove for any X ∈ X that X ∈ opt(X|A) if and only if X ∈
opt({X,Y }|A) for all Y ∈ X .
Indeed, by Property 4, for any X and Y in X , it holds that
opt(X|A) =


opt({X,Y }|A), or
opt(X \ {X,Y }|A), or
opt({X,Y }|A) ∪ opt(X \ {X,Y }|A).
and hence, if X ∈ opt(X|A) then the second option is impossible and therefore
X ∈ opt({X,Y }|A) for all Y ∈ Y.
Conversely, again by Property 4
opt(X|A) = opt
( ⋃
Y ∈X
{X,Y }
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
=
⋃
Y ∈Y
opt({X,Y }|A)
for some subset Y of X , and hence, if X ∈ opt({X,Y }|A) for all Y ∈ X , then
X ∈ opt(X|A).
Property 6 =⇒ Property 2. Assume that opt(X|A) ∩ Y 6= ∅. This means
that there must be an Y ∗ ∈ Y such that Y ∗ A X for all X ∈ X . Clearly,
Y ∗ ∈ opt(Y|A). But, for all Y ∈ opt(Y|A) it must also hold that Y A Y ∗, and
hence Y A X for all X ∈ X as A is transitive. We conclude:
opt(Y|A) = {Y ∈ Y : (∀X ∈ X )(Y A X)} = opt(X|A) ∩ Y

A.4. Proof of Lemma 16.
Proof. If N is the root of T , then the statement is trivial. If N ∈ ch(T ), then
the statement follows from (i). Otherwise, N must belong to stK(T ) for some
K ∈ ch(T ).
First, note that K is a node of at least one element of norm(T ). Indeed, it is
given that N is a node of at least one element, say U , of norm(T ). Then, obviously,
K must also be a node of U , simply because any node on the unique path within
T between the root of T and N must be a node of U , and one of those nodes is K.
So, K is a node of an element of norm(T ) (namely, U).
Secondly, note that N is also a node of at least one element of norm(stK(T )).
Indeed, N is a node of an element of norm(T ), and hence, in particular also of
stK(norm(T )). But, by (i), and the fact that K is a node of at least one element of
norm(T ) (as just proven), it follows that stK(norm(T )) = norm(stK(T )). Hence,
N is also a node of at least one element of norm(stK(T )).
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Combining everything, it follows that
norm(stN (T )) = norm(stN (stK(T )))
so, by (ii), and because N is in at least one element of norm(stK(T )),
= stN (norm(stK(T )))
hence, by (i), and since K is in at least one element of norm(T ),
= stN (stK(norm(T ))) = stN (norm(T )).

A.5. Proof of Lemma 17.
Proof. The statement is trivial if n = 1 (because, in that case, A1 = Ω). Let us
prove the statement also in case n ≥ 2.
Let X =
⊕n
i=1 AiXi. Consider any k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and let
Zk =
⊕
j 6=k
A′jXj
where (A′j)j 6=k forms an arbitrary partition of Ω such that Ak∩A
′
j = Aj for all j 6= k.
Clearly, Zk is Ak ∩B-consistent because we can trivially find a consistent decision
tree T with ev(T ) = Ak ∩B and gamb(T ) = Zk, using the Aj ∩B-consistency (and
hence, Ak ∩ A′j ∩B-consistency) of each Xj for j 6= k.
Now, observe that by construction of Zk,
X = AkXk ⊕AkZk =
⋃
Zk∈Zk
(AkXk ⊕AkZk).
Note that X is B-consistent (indeed, because each Xi is Ai ∩B-consistent, we can
trivially find a consistent decision tree T with ev(T ) = B and gamb(T ) = X ).
Since Property 2 holds, Property 4 holds as well by Lemma 15. So, if we apply
opt(·|B) on both sides of the above equality, then it follows from Property 4 that
opt(X|B) =
⋃
Zk∈Z∗k
opt(AkXk ⊕AkZk|B),
for some Z∗k ⊆ Zk. By Property 3,
=
⋃
Zk∈Z∗k
(Ak opt(Xk|Ak ∩B)⊕AkZ)
= Ak opt(Xk|Ak ∩B)⊕AkZ
∗
k(18)
Since this holds for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we arrive at Eq. (9), by Lemma 43. 
We used the following lemma.
Lemma 43. Let A1, . . . , An be a finite partition of Ω, n ≥ 2. Let X , and X1, Z1,
. . . , Xn, Zn be non-empty finite sets of gambles. If
X = AkXk ⊕AkZk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
X =
n⊕
i=1
AiXi.
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Proof. Let us prove the implication by induction.
The implication holds for n = 2. Indeed, suppose that
X = A1X1 ⊕A1Z1 = A2X2 ⊕A2Z2.
By multiplying all elements of these sets with A2, and noting that A1 = A2 and
A2 = A1, we find that
A1Z1 = A2X2
which establishes the base step.
For the induction step, assume that the implication holds for n = m. We prove
that the implication also holds for n = m+ 1. Suppose that
X = A1X1 ⊕A1Z1
X = A2X2 ⊕A2Z2
...
X = Am+1Xm+1 ⊕Am+1Zm+1
First, note that the equality A1X1 ⊕ A1Z1 = A2X2 ⊕ A2Z2 implies in particular
that (by multiplying all elements of these sets with A1)
A1Z1 = A2X2 ⊕ (A1 ∩ A2)Z2
Hence,
X = A1X1 ⊕A1Z1 = A1X1 ⊕A1(A2X2 ⊕ (A1 ∩ A2)Z2)
= A1X1 ⊕A2X2 ⊕ (A1 ∩A2)Z2
= (A1 ∪A2)(A1X1 ⊕A2X2)⊕ (A1 ∩ A2)Z2
With A∗1 = A1 ∪ A2, X
∗
1 = A1X1 ⊕A2X2, and Z
∗
1 = Z2, we now have that
X = A∗1X
∗
1 ⊕A
∗
1Z
∗
1
X = A3X3 ⊕A3Z3
...
X = Am+1Xm+1 ⊕Am+1Zm+1
By assumption, the implication to be proven already holds for n = m, so, from the
above equalities, it follows that
X = A∗1X
∗
1 ⊕A3X3 ⊕ . . .⊕Am+1Xm+1
and, by construction of A∗1 and X
∗
1 ,
=
m+1⊕
i=1
AiXi
which proves the induction step. 
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A.6. Proof of Lemma 18.
Proof. By Eq. (5), Eq. (10) holds if and only if
gamb(nfd(Ti)) ∩ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) 6= ∅,
or equivalently, if and only if there is a normal form decision U ∈ nfd(Ti) such that
gamb(U) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) (remember that gamb(U) is a singleton).
But, by definition of the gamb operator, it also holds that gamb(U) = gamb(⊔U).
Hence, Eq. (10) holds if and only if there is a normal form decision U ∈ nfd(Ti)
such that gamb(⊔U) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )), or equivalently, if and only if there
is a normal form decision V ∈ nfd(T ) which contains the node Ni, such that
gamb(V ) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )).
By definition of normopt, this is equivalent to stating that Eq. (10) holds if and
only if Ni is in at least one element of normopt(T ). 
A.7. Proof of Lemma 19.
Proof. Assume that Eq. (11) holds.
First, consider a normal form decision U ∈
⊙n
i=1Ei normopt(Ti). Obviously,
gamb(U) ⊆ gamb
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti)
)
so, by the definition of gamb, Eq. (7) in particular,
=
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(normopt(Ti))
and hence, by Eq. (11),
= gamb(normopt(T )).
So, there exists a normal form decision V ∈ normopt(T ) such that gamb(V ) =
gamb(U). Since U ∈ nfd(T ), by definition of normopt we have U ∈ normopt(T ). So
we have shown that
normopt(T ) ⊇
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti).
Next, consider a normal form decision U ∈ normopt(T ). We know by Eq. (11)
that
gamb(U) ⊆
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(normopt(Ti)).
We can write U =
⊙n
i=1EiUi, where Ui ∈ nfd(Ti), so
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ui) ⊆
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(normopt(Ti)).
Consider any k and any normal form decision Vk ∈ normopt(Tk). The above
equation, and Eq. (6), tell us that we can choose each Vk such that Ek gamb(Vk) =
Ek gamb(Uk). Of course, because Vk ∈ normopt(Tk),
gamb(Vk) ⊆ opt(gamb(Tk)|ev(Tk)).
We wish to establish that also gamb(Uk) ⊆ opt(gamb(Tk)|ev(Tk)).
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Indeed, this follows from Property 1: observe that both singletons gamb(Uk) and
gamb(Vk) are subsets of gamb(Tk), Ek gamb(Uk) = Ek gamb(Vk), and gamb(Vk) ⊆
opt(gamb(Tk)|ev(Tk)). Consistency of T confirms that gamb(Tk) is ev(Tk)-consistent.
Hence, Property 1 applies, and
gamb(Uk) ⊆ opt(gamb(Tk)|ev(Tk)).
Therefore, Uk ∈ normopt(Tk) by definition of normopt(Ti). Since this holds for
any k, we conclude that U ∈
⊙n
i=1Ei normopt(Ti). So, we have shown that also
normopt(T ) ⊆
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti).

A.8. Proof of Lemma 20.
Proof. Assume that Eq. (12) holds.
Consider any normal form decision V ∈ nfd
(⊔
i∈I normopt(Ti)
)
. By definition
of gamb,
gamb(V ) ⊆
⋃
i∈I
gamb(normopt(Ti))
and, by Eq. (12),
= gamb(normopt(T )).
Hence, by definition of normopt, and the obvious fact that V ∈ nfd(T ), it follows
that V ∈ normopt(T ). So we have shown that
normopt(T ) ⊇ nfd
(⊔
i∈I
normopt(Ti)
)
.
Conversely, let V ∈ normopt(T ). Then, again by Eq. (12),
gamb(V ) ⊆ gamb(normopt(T )) =
⋃
i∈I
gamb(normopt(Ti)).
Now V = ⊔U where U ∈ nfd(Ti) for some i ∈ I. We want to show that U ∈
normopt(Ti).
Indeed, let X be the gamble corresponding to V , and also U ,
gamb(V ) = gamb(U) = {X}.
Because V ∈ normopt(T ), we know that X ∈ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )). It is established
that U ∈ normopt(Ti) if we can show that X ∈ opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(Ti)). But this
follows at once from Property 2, because i ∈ I (and the definition of I), gamb(Ti) ⊆
gamb(T ), ev(T ) = ev(Ti), and all sets of gambles are consistent with respect to the
relevant events:
opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(Ti)) = opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) ∩ gamb(Ti).
Concluding, also
normopt(T ) ⊆ nfd
(⊔
i∈I
normopt(Ti)
)
.

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A.9. Proof of Lemma 21.
Proof. Assume that normopt is subtree perfect.
We first establish Property 1. Let A be a non-empty event, and let X be a non-
empty finite set of A-consistent gambles such that {X,Y } ⊆ X with AX = AY
and X ∈ opt(X|A). We show that Y ∈ opt(X|A). If A = Ω the result is trivial, so
assume A ⊂ Ω.
Consider a consistent decision tree T = AT1⊙AT2, where ev(T ) = Ω, gamb(T1) =
X , and T2 is a normal form decision with gamb(T2) = {Z}, an A-consistent gamble
(see the left tree in Fig. 6). We know by consistency of the gambles that there is
such a T (see Definition 9).
Consider U ∈ nfd(T1) with gamb(U) = {X} and V ∈ nfd(T1) with gamb(V ) =
{Y }. By definition of normopt, we have U ∈ normopt(Ti). Therefore by subtree
perfectness, AU⊙AT2 ∈ normopt(T ) and of course AV ⊙AT2 ∈ normopt(T ). Again
by subtree perfectness, V ∈ normopt(Ti), whence Y ∈ opt(X|A).
Next, we establish Property 2. Let A be a non-empty event, and let Y ⊆ X
be non-empty finite A-consistent sets of gambles such that opt(X|A) ∩ Y 6= ∅. We
show that opt(Y|A) = opt(X|A) ∩ Y.
Let T = T1 ⊔ T2 be a consistent decision tree with ev(T ) = A, gamb(T1) = Y
and gamb(T2) = X (see the right tree in Fig. 6). We know by consistency of the
gambles that there is such a T .
Let N be the decision node at the root of T1. By subtree perfectness, we have
gamb(stN (normopt(T ))) = gamb(normopt(stN (T ))).
The right-hand side is equal to opt(Y|A). Also,
gamb(stN (normopt(T ))) = gamb(normopt(T )) ∩ gamb(stN (T ))
= opt(X|A) ∩ Y
as required.
Finally, we establish Property 3. Let A and B be events such that A ∩ B 6= ∅
and A ∩ B 6= ∅, let X be a non-empty finite A ∩ B-consistent set of gambles, and
let Z be a A ∩B-consistent gamble.
Let T = AT1⊙AT2 be a consistent decision tree such that ev(T ) = B, gamb(T1) =
X , and gamb(T2) = {Z} (see the left tree in Fig. 6).
By subtree perfectness, we have (letting N be the root node of T1)
gamb(stN (normopt(T ))) = gamb(normopt(stN (T ))).
Here, the right-hand side is opt(X|A ∩B), and
gamb(stN (normopt(T ))) = {X ∈ X : AX ⊕AZ ∈ opt(AX ⊕AZ|B),
whence Property 3 follows. 
A.10. Proof of Theorem 25. Before we prove Theorem 25, we prove a few lem-
mas, provide two counterexamples, and introduce a new property called path inde-
pendence.
Lemma 44 (Sen [24, Proposition 17]). A choice function opt satisfies Property 9
if and only if, for any non-empty event A and any finite family of non-empty finite
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A-consistent sets of gambles X1, . . .Xn,
opt
(
n⋃
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
⊆ opt
(
n⋃
i=1
opt(Xi|A)
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
⊆
n⋃
i=1
opt(Xi|A).
Property 11. A choice function opt is said to be path independent if, for any
non-empty event A, and for any finite family of non-empty finite A-consistent sets
of gambles X1, . . . , Xn,
opt
(
n⋃
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
opt(Xi|A)
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
.
Path independence appears frequently in the social choice literature. Plott [18]
gives a detailed investigation of path independence and its possible justifications.
Path independence is also equivalent to Axiom 7′ of Luce and Raiffa [15, p. 289].
Lemma 45 (Sen [24, Proposition 19]). A choice function opt satisfies Properties 8
and 9 if and only if opt satisfies Property 11.
Properties 8, 9, and 11 are expressed slightly differently here than in Sen [24],
who does not use the concepts of conditioning and consistency. Despite this, the
proofs of Lemmas 44 and 45 proceed identically to the corresponding propositions
by Sen. Also, Sen defines path independence only for pairs of subsets, but Plott [18,
Theorem 1, p. 1082] shows that this type of path independence is indeed equivalent
to Property 11.
Lemma 46. Let A1, . . . , An be a finite partition of Ω, n ≥ 2. Let X , and X1, Z1,
. . . , Xn, Zn be finite sets of gambles. If
X ⊆ AkXk ⊕AkZk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
X ⊆
n⊕
k=1
AkXk.
Proof. Let X ∈ X , then X ∈ AkXk ⊕ AkZk for all k. Therefore, for each k, there
is an Xk ∈ Xk such that AkX = AkXk. Whence,
X =
n⊕
k=1
AkXk ∈
n⊕
k=1
AkXk.

Lemma 47. Let A1, . . . , An be a finite partition of Ω. Let B be any event such
that Ai ∩ B 6= ∅ for all Ai. Let X1, . . . , Xn be a finite family of non-empty finite
sets of gambles where each Xi is Ai∩B-consistent. If a choice function opt satisfies
Properties 9 and 10, then
(19) opt
(
n⊕
i=1
AiXi
∣∣∣∣∣B
)
⊆
n⊕
i=1
Ai opt(Xi|Ai ∩B).
Proof. Let X =
⊕n
i=1AiXi. Consider any k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and let
Zk =
⊕
j 6=k
A′jXj
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where (A′j)j 6=k forms an arbitrary partition of Ω such that Ak∩A
′
j = Aj for all j 6= k.
Clearly, Zk is Ak ∩B-consistent because we can trivially find a consistent decision
tree T with ev(T ) = Ak ∩B and gamb(T ) = Zk, using the Aj ∩B-consistency (and
hence, Ak ∩ A′j ∩B-consistency) of each Xj for j 6= k.
Now, observe that by construction of Zk,
X = AkXk ⊕AkZk =
⋃
Zk∈Zk
(AkXk ⊕AkZk).
Note that X is B-consistent (indeed, because each Xi is Ai ∩B-consistent, we can
trivially find a consistent decision tree T with ev(T ) = B and gamb(T ) = X ).
If we apply opt(·|B) on both sides of the above equality, then it follows from
Lemma 44 that
opt(X|B) ⊆
⋃
Zk∈Zk
opt
(
AkXk ⊕AkZk|B
)
and by Property 10 (once noted that Xk is Ak ∩ B-consistent by assumption, and
Zk is Ak ∩B-consistent by construction),
⊆
⋃
Zk∈Zk
(Ak opt(Xk|Ak ∩B)⊕AkZk)
= Ak opt(Xk|Ak ∩B)⊕AkZk
whence by Lemma 46,
opt(X|B) ⊆
n⊕
i=1
Ai opt(Xi|Ai ∩B).

Lemma 48. Let A1, . . . , An be a finite partition of Ω. Let B be any event such
that Ai∩B 6= ∅ for all Ai. Let X1, . . . , Xn be a finite family of non-empty finite sets
of gambles, where each Xi is Ai ∩ B-consistent. If a choice function opt satisfies
Properties 8, 9, and 10, then
(20) opt
(
n⊕
i=1
AiXi
∣∣∣∣∣B
)
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ai opt(Xi|Ai ∩B)
∣∣∣∣∣B
)
.
Proof. By Lemma 47 and the definition of opt,
opt
(
n⊕
i=1
AiXi
∣∣∣∣∣B
)
⊆
n⊕
i=1
Ai opt(Xi|Ai ∩B) ⊆
n⊕
i=1
AiXi,
whence Eq. (20) follows by Property 8. 
Lemma 49. For any consistent decision tree T =
⊙n
i=1EiTi and any choice func-
tion opt satisfying Property 7,
(21) gamb(normopt(T )) = gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti)
))
implies
normopt(T ) = normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti)
)
.
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Proof. In this proof we require Eq. (6), and the following consequence of Eq. (7):
(22) gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti)
))
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T ) ∩ Ei)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
.
We first show that
normopt(T ) ⊇ normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti)
)
.
Consider a normal form decision U ∈ normopt(
⊙n
i=1Ei normopt(Ti)). We have,
by Eq. (21),
gamb(U) ⊆ gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti)
))
= gamb(normopt(T )).
So, there exists a normal form decision V ∈ normopt(T ) such that gamb(V ) =
gamb(U). Since U ∈ nfd(T ), by definition of normopt, U ∈ normopt(T ), which
establishes the claim.
Next, we show that
normopt(T ) ⊆ normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(Ti)
)
.
Consider a normal form decision U ∈ normopt(T ). We know by Eq. (21) and
Eq. (22) that
gamb(U) ⊆ opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T ) ∩ Ei)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
.
We can write U =
⊙n
i=1EiUi, where Ui ∈ nfd(Ti), so by Eq. (4b),
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ui) ⊆ opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T ) ∩ Ei)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
.
Consider normal form decisions Vi ∈ normopt(Ti). The above equation, and Eq. (6)
tell us that, for each i, we can find Vi such that Ei gamb(Vi) = Ei gamb(Ui). Of
course, because Vi ∈ normopt(Ti),
gamb(Vi) ⊆ opt(gamb(Ti)|Ei ∩ ev(T )).
We further have, for V =
⊙n
i=1EiVi, gamb(V ) = gamb(U) and V ∈ nfd(T ), and
so V ∈ normopt(T ).
If we can establish that
(23) gamb(Ui) ⊆ opt(gamb(Ti)|Ei ∩ ev(T )),
then, by definition of normopt and because Ui ∈ nfd(Ti), it follows that Ui ∈
normopt(Ti). So, in that case, there is a V ∈ normopt(
⊙n
i=1Ei normopt(Ti)) such
that gamb(V ) = gamb(U), and U ∈ nfd(
⊙n
i=1 Ei normopt(Ti)). Therefore by def-
inition of normopt, we will have U ∈ normopt(
⊙n
i=1 Ei normopt(Ti)), establishing
the desired result.
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We show that Eq. (23) indeed holds by Property 7. When n = 1 the re-
sult is trivial, so assume n ≥ 2. Observe that both singletons gamb(Ui) and
gamb(Vi) are subsets of gamb(Ti), Ei gamb(Ui) = Ei gamb(Vi), and gamb(Vi) ⊆
opt(gamb(Ti)|Ei ∩ ev(T )). Further, gamb(Ti) is Ei ∩ ev(T )-consistent. We are
almost ready to apply Property 7.
We know that
gamb(V ) =
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Vi) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T ))
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
.
Letting
Z = (E1 ∪ E2) gamb(V2)⊕ E3 gamb(V3)⊕ . . .⊕ En gamb(Vn)
and
Z = (E1 ∪ E2) gamb(T2)⊕ E3 gamb(T3)⊕ . . .⊕ En gamb(Tn),
we see that Z ∈ Z and Z is E1 ∩ ev(T )-consistent. Further,
E1 gamb(V1)⊕ E1Z =
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Vi) = gamb(V )
and
E1 gamb(T1)⊕ E1Z =
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ti).
We see that
E1 gamb(V )⊕ E1Z ⊆ opt(E1 gamb(T1)⊕ E1Z|ev(T )).
Hence we have found a Z and a Z ∈ Z required to apply Property 7. Finally, by
E1 gamb(U1) = E1 gamb(V1), and Property 7, we have
gamb(U1) ⊆ opt(gamb(T1)|E1 ∩ ev(T )).
This argument applies for any index i and therefore Eq. (23) has been shown,
establishing the result. 
Lemma 50. For any consistent decision tree T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti, and any choice function
opt satisfying Property 9,
(24) gamb(normopt(T )) = gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
normopt(Ti)
))
implies
normopt(T ) = normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
normopt(Ti)
)
.
Proof. In this proof we require of Eq. (6). For clarity, let A = ev(T ) = ev(Ti). We
first show that
normopt(T ) ⊇ normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
normopt(Ti)
)
.
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Consider a normal form decisionU ∈ normopt(
⊔n
i=1 normopt(Ti)). To show that U ∈
normopt(T ), we must show that U ∈ nfd(T ) and gamb(U) ⊆ gamb(normopt(T )).
The former is obvious, and the latter is established by Eq. (24):
gamb(U) ⊆ gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
normopt(Ti)
))
= gamb(normopt(T )).
Next we show that
normopt(T ) ⊆ normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
normopt(Ti)
)
.
Let U ∈ normopt(T ). To show that U ∈ normopt(
⊔n
i=1 normopt(Ti)) we must show
that U ∈ nfd(
⊔n
i=1 normopt(Ti)) and that
gamb(U) ⊆ gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
normopt(Ti)
))
.
The latter requirement follows immediately from Eq. (24):
gamb(U) ⊆ gamb(normopt(T )) = gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
normopt(Ti)
))
.
We now prove that U ∈ nfd(
⊔n
i=1 normopt(Ti)). Let V be U with the root
node removed, that is, U = ⊔V . Clearly, for some k, V ∈ nfd(Tk). It suffices
to show that V ∈ normopt(Tk). Let {X} = gamb(U) = gamb(V ). We know
that X ∈ opt(gamb(T )|A), and also that X ∈ gamb(Tk). If we can prove that
X ∈ gamb(normopt(Tk)) = opt(gamb(Tk)|A), then V ∈ normopt(Tk). Indeed,
using Property 9 and gamb(Tk) ⊆ gamb(T ) we have
opt(gamb(Tk)|A) ⊇ gamb(Tk) ∩ opt(gamb(T )|A).
So we have shown that indeed X ∈ opt(gamb(Tk)|A), establishing the claim. 
Lemma 51. If backopt(T ) = normopt(T ) for any consistent decision tree T , then
opt satisfies Property 7.
Proof. Let A and B be non-empty events, and X , Z be non-empty finite sets of
gambles, such that the following properties hold: A ∩ B 6= ∅, A ∩ B 6= ∅, X
is A ∩ B-consistent, Z is A ∩ B-consistent, and there are X,Y ∈ X such that
AX = AY , X ∈ opt(X|A ∩ B), and AX ⊕ AZ ∈ opt(AX ⊕ AZ|B) for at least
one Z ∈ Z. If it is not possible to construct such a situation, then opt satisfies
Property 7 automatically. Otherwise, to prove that Property 7 holds, we must show
that Y ∈ opt(X|A ∩B).
Consider a consistent decision tree T = AT1⊙AT2, where ev(T ) = B, gamb(T1) =
X , and gamb(T2) = Z. Since X is A ∩ B-consistent and Z is A ∩ B-consistent,
we know from Definition 9 that there is such a T . We have gamb(normopt(T )) =
opt(gamb(T )|B) = opt(AX ⊕ AZ|B). So, AX ⊕ AZ ∈ gamb(normopt(T )), and of
course AX ⊕AZ = AY ⊕AZ.
Therefore, any normal form decision in nfd(T ) that induces the gamble AY ⊕AZ
must be in normopt(T ). In particular, by Lemma 42 there is a normal form decision
U ∈ nfd(T1) such that gamb(U) = {Y }, and a normal form decision V ∈ nfd(T2)
such that gamb(V ) = {Z}. So AU ⊙AV ∈ nfd(T ) and gamb(AU ⊙AV ) = {AY ⊕
AZ}. Indeed, because AX ⊕ AZ ∈ opt(AX ⊕ AZ|B), it follows that AU ⊙ AV ∈
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normopt(T ) = backopt(T ). By definition, backopt(T ) = normopt(Abackopt(T1) ⊙
Abackopt(T2)), and so it must hold that U ∈ backopt(T1) = normopt(T1). Whence,
gamb(U) ⊆ gamb(normopt(Ti)) = opt(X|A ∩ B). Since gamb(U) = {Y }, we have
Y ∈ opt(X|A ∩B), establishing Property 7. 
Lemma 52. If gamb(backopt(T )) = gamb(normopt(T )) for any consistent decision
tree T , then opt satisfies Property 11.
Proof. Let A be a non-empty event, and X1, . . . , Xn be non-empty finite sets of A-
consistent gambles. Let T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti be a consistent decision tree, with gamb(Ti) =
Xi for each i, and where ev(T ) = A. The existence of T is assured by A-consistency
of X (see Definition 9). We have
opt
(
n⋃
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
= gamb(normopt(T )) = gamb(backopt(T ))
= gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
backopt(Ti)
))
From Eq. (6), we have gamb(normopt(T )) = opt(gamb(T )|A). Similarly, with re-
peated applications of Eq. (6) and Eq. (8),
= opt
(
gamb
(
n⊔
i=1
backopt(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
gamb(backopt(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
gamb(normopt(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
opt(gamb(Ti)|A)
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
.
Finally, we note that gamb(T ) =
⋃n
i=1 Xi and gamb(Ti) = Xi. Therefore,
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
opt(Xi|A)
∣∣∣∣∣A
)
.

Lemma 53. If gamb(backopt(T )) = gamb(normopt(T )) for any consistent decision
tree T , then opt satisfies Property 10.
Proof. Let A and B be non-empty events such that A ∩ B 6= ∅ and A ∩ B 6= ∅,
let X be a non-empty finite set of A ∩ B-consistent gambles, and let Z be an
A ∩B-consistent gamble. Let T = AT1 ⊙AT2 be a consistent decision tree, where
ev(T ) = B, gamb(T1) = X , and gamb(T2) = {Z}. The existence of T is assured by
A ∩B-consistency of X and A ∩B-consistency of {Z}. By assumption,
gamb(normopt(T )) = gamb(backopt(T ))
= gamb(normopt(Abackopt(T1)⊙AT2)).
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From Eq. (6), we have gamb(normopt(T )) = opt(gamb(T )|B). Similarly, with
repeated applications of Eq. (6) and Eq. (7),
gamb(normopt(Abackopt(T1)⊙AT2)) = opt(gamb(Abackopt(T1)⊙AT2)|B)
= opt(A gamb(backopt(T1))⊕AZ|B)
= opt(A gamb(normopt(T1))⊕AZ|B)
= opt(A opt(gamb(T1)|A ∩B)⊕AZ|B).
Finally we note that gamb(T ) = AX ⊕AZ, and gamb(T1) = X . Therefore,
opt(AX ⊕AZ|B) = opt(A opt(X|A ∩B)⊕AZ|B) ⊆ A opt(X|A ∩B)⊕AZ.

We now prove Theorem 25.
Proof of Theorem 25. “only if”. By Lemmas 51, 52, and 53, we see that satisfying
backward induction implies Properties 7, 10, and 11. Lemma 45 completes the
proof.
“if”. We prove this part by structural induction on the tree. In the base step,
we prove that the implication holds for consistent decision trees which consist of
only a single node. In the induction step, we prove that if the implication holds for
the subtrees at every child of the root node, then the implication also holds for the
whole tree.
First, if the decision tree T has only a single node, and hence, a reward at the
root and no further children, then by definition (Eq. (4a) in particular) we have
backopt(T ) = normopt(T ).
Next, suppose T is consistent and has a chance node as its root, that is, T =⊙n
i=1EiTi. By the induction hypothesis, we know that for every Ti,
(25) gamb(backopt(Ti)) = gamb(normopt(Ti)).
We show that backopt(T ) = normopt(T ). By Lemma 49, it therefore suffices to
show that gamb(normopt(T )) = gamb(backopt(T )). By Eq. (6) and the definition
of gamb,
gamb(normopt(T )) = opt(gamb(T )|ev(T ))
= opt
(
gamb
(
n⊙
i=1
EiTi
)∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(Ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
,
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and by Eq. (25), Eq. (6), and the definition of gamb,
gamb(backopt(T )) = gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei backopt(Ti)
))
= opt
(
gamb
(
n⊙
i=1
Ei backopt(Ti)
)∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(backopt(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei gamb(normopt(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⊕
i=1
Ei opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T ) ∩ Ei)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
,
whence equality follows from Lemma 48.
Finally, suppose that the root of the consistent tree T is a decision node, that is
T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti. We show that backopt(T ) = normopt(T ). By Lemma 50, it suffices to
show that gamb(backopt(T )) = gamb(normopt(T )). Indeed,
gamb(normopt(T )) = opt(gamb(T )|ev(T ))
= opt
(
gamb
(
n⊔
i=1
Ti
)∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
gamb(Ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
,
and,
gamb
(
normopt
(
n⊔
i=1
backopt(Ti)
))
= opt
(
gamb
(
n⊔
i=1
backopt(Ti)
)∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
gamb(backopt(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
gamb(normopt(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(Ti))
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
= opt
(
n⋃
i=1
opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T ))
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
,
whence equality follows by Lemma 45 and Property 11.
Concluding, we have shown that the implication holds for consistent decision
trees consisting of a single nodes, and that if the implication holds for all children
of the root node then it also holds for the whole tree. By induction, the implication
holds for any consistent decision tree. 
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A.11. Proof of Lemma 26.
Proof. Assume Property 2 holds.
Consider any non-empty finite sets of normal form decisions X and Y, and any
event A 6= ∅, such that opt(X|A) ⊆ Y ⊆ X . By Property 2, it follows that
opt(Y|A) = opt(X|A) ∩ Y, which is equal to opt(X|A) because opt(X|A) ⊆ Y.
This proves Property 8.
Consider any non-empty finite sets of normal form decisions X and Y, and any
event A 6= ∅ such that Y ⊆ X . If opt(X|A) ∩ Y = ∅, then obviously opt(Y|A) ⊇
opt(X|A) ∩ Y. If not, then opt(Y|A) = opt(X|A) ∩ Y. So, Property 9 follows. 
A.12. Proof of Theorem 29.
Lemma 54. Let norm be any normal form operator. Let T be a consistent decision
tree. If,
(i) for all nodes K ∈ ch(T ) such that K is in at least one element of norm(T ),
stK(norm(T )) ⊆ norm(stK(T )),
(ii) and, for all nodes K ∈ ch(T ), and all nodes L ∈ stK(T ) such that L is in
at least one element of norm(stK(T )),
stL(norm(stK(T ))) ⊆ norm(stL(stK(T ))),
then, for all nodes N in T such that N is in at least one element of norm(T ),
stN (norm(T )) ⊆ norm(stN (T )).
Proof. If N is the root of T , then the result is immediate. If N ∈ ch(T ), then the
result follows from (i). Otherwise, N must be in stK(T ) for one K ∈ ch(T ).
By assumption, there is a U ∈ norm(T ) that contains N (and of course also K).
Therefore, U ∈ stK(norm(T )), and by (i), stK(U) ∈ norm(stK(T )), and so N is
also in at least one element of norm(stK(T )).
We use the fact that, if U and V are sets of normal form decisions such that
U ⊆ V , then for any node N , stN (U) ⊆ stN (V). Combining everything, by (i),
stN (stK(norm(T ))) ⊆ stN (norm(stK(T )))
hence, since N is in at least one element of norm(stK(T )), by (ii) we have
⊆ norm(stN (stK(T ))),
whence the desired result follows, since stN (stK(T )) = stN (T ). 
The following results are very similar to Lemmas 51, 52, and 53.
Lemma 55. If normopt is subtree perfect for normal form decisions, then opt
satisfies Property 7.
Proof. Let A and B be non-empty events, and X , Z be non-empty finite sets of
gambles, such that the following properties hold: A ∩ B 6= ∅, A ∩ B 6= ∅, X
is A ∩ B-consistent, Z is A ∩ B-consistent, and there are X,Y ∈ X such that
AX = AY , X ∈ opt(X|A ∩ B), and AX ⊕ AZ ∈ opt(AX ⊕ AZ|B) for at least
one Z ∈ Z. If it is not possible to construct such a situation, then opt satisfies
Property 7 automatically. Otherwise, to prove that Property 7 holds, we must show
that Y ∈ opt(X|A ∩B).
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Consider a consistent decision tree T = AT1⊙AT2, where ev(T ) = B, gamb(T1) =
X , and gamb(T2) = Z. Since X is A ∩B-consistent and Z is A ∩B-consistent, we
know from Definition 9 that there is such a T . By Lemma 42, there is a normal
form decision U ∈ nfd(T1) such that gamb(U) = {Y }, and a normal form decision
in V ∈ nfd(T2) such that gamb(V ) = {Z}.
Since, by assumption, AX = AY , obviously AX ⊕AZ = AY ⊕AZ, and hence,
also AY ⊕ AZ ∈ opt(AX ⊕ AZ|B). Therefore, by definition of normopt, AU ⊙
AV ∈ normopt(T ). In particular, U ∈ stN (normopt(T )), where N is the root of T1.
Because normopt is subtree perfect for normal form decisions, it follows that also
U ∈ normopt(stN (T )) = normopt(T1). Again applying the definition of normopt, we
conclude that indeed Y ∈ opt(X|A ∩B). 
Lemma 56. If normopt is subtree perfect for normal form decisions, then opt
satisfies Property 9.
Proof. Let A be a non-empty event, and let X be a non-empty finite set of A-
consistent gambles. Let Y be a non-empty subset of X . Let T = T1 ⊔ T2, where
ev(T ) = A, gamb(T1) = Y, and gamb(T2) = X . Let N be the root of T1.
If opt(X|A) ∩ Y = ∅ then Property 9 holds automatically. Suppose opt(X|A) ∩
Y 6= ∅. By definition of normopt, N appears in at least one element of normopt(T ),
and
opt(X|A) ∩ Y = gamb(stN (normopt(T ))),
and by subtree perfectness of normal form decisions
⊆ gamb(normopt(T1))
= opt(Y|A).

Lemma 57. If normopt is subtree perfect for normal form decisions, then opt
satisfies Property 10.
Proof. Let A and B be non-empty events such that A ∩B 6= ∅ and A ∩B 6= ∅, let
X be a non-empty finite set of A ∩ B-consistent gambles, and let Z be an A ∩ B-
consistent gamble. Let T = AT1⊙AT2 be a consistent decision tree, where ev(T ) =
B, gamb(T1) = X , and T2 is simply a normal form decision with gamb(T2) = {Z}.
The existence of T is assured by A ∩B-consistency of X and A ∩B-consistency of
{Z}. Let N be the root of T1.
Consider any gamble AX ⊕ AZ ∈ opt(AX ⊕ AZ|B). By Lemma 42, there is
a U ∈ nfd(T1) such that gamb(U) = X . By definition of normopt, it follows that
AU ⊙ AT2 ∈ normopt(T ), and hence, in particular, U ∈ stN (normopt(T )). By
subtree perfectness for normal form decisions, U ∈ normopt(T1). Again applying
the definition of normopt, we find that X ∈ opt(X|A∩B), thus indeed AX ⊕AZ ∈
A opt(X|A ∩B)⊕AZ, whence Property 10 is established. 
We can now prove Theorem 29.
Proof of Theorem 29. “only if”. Follows from Lemmas 55, 56, and 57.
“if”. We proceed as usual by structural induction. The base step is trivial as
usual. Let ch(T ) = {K1, . . . ,Kn} and let Ti = stKi(T ). The induction hypothesis
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says that normopt is subtree perfect for normal form decisions on all Ti. More
precisely, for all Ti, and for every L that is in at least one element of normopt(Ti),
stL(normopt(Ti) ⊆ normopt(stL(T )).
We must show that, for any N in at least one element of normopt(T ),
stN (norm(T )) ⊆ norm(stN (T )).
By the induction hypothesis and Lemma 54, it suffices to show this only for N ∈
ch(T ), that is, to show that
(26) stKi(normopt(T )) ⊆ normopt(Ti)
for each i such that Ki is in at least one element of normopt(T ).
Suppose the root of T is a decision node, so T =
⊔n
i=1 Ti. Let U be an element of
normopt(T ). There is a j such that Kj is in U ; let Uj denote stKj (U). To establish
Eq. (26) we must show that Uj ∈ normopt(Tj).
Note that gamb(Uj) = gamb(U) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) since U ∈ normopt(T ).
Obviously, also gamb(Uj) ∈ gamb(Tj) by definition of gamb. Hence, it must hold
that
gamb(Uj) ⊆ opt(gamb(T )|ev(T )) ∩ gamb(Tj),
but, also, because gamb(Tj) ⊆ gamb(T ), and once noted that ev(T ) = ev(Tj), it
follows from Property 9 that
⊆ opt(gamb(Tj)|ev(Tj))
Putting everything together, we confirm that Uj ∈ normopt(Tj). This proves the
induction step for decision nodes.
Now suppose that the root of T is a chance node, so T =
⊙n
i=1 EiTi. Again,
let U =
⊙n
i=1EiUi ∈ normopt(T ). To establish Eq. (26) we must show that Ui ∈
normopt(Ti) for all i.
Indeed, since U ∈ normopt(T ),
gamb(U) ∈ opt(gamb(T )) = opt
(⊕
Ei gamb(Ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ev(T )
)
so by Lemma 47,
⊆
⊕
Ei opt(gamb(Ti)|ev(T ) ∩ Ei).
So, for each Ti, there is a normal form decision Vi ∈ normopt(Ti) such that Ei gamb(Vi) =
Ei gamb(Ui). Can we apply Property 7?
Obviously, {gamb(Vi), gamb(Ui)} ⊆ gamb(Ti), and
Ei gamb(Vi)⊕ EiZ = gamb(U)
⊆ opt(
⊕
Ei gamb(Ti)|ev(T )) = opt(Ei gamb(Ti)⊕ EiZ|ev(T ))
for suitable choices for Z and a Z ∈ Z. Therefore we can apply Property 7 to
conclude that Ui is in normopt(Ti) for each i. This proves the induction step for
chance nodes. 
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A.13. Proofs for Section 7.2.
Proof of Lemma 30. If N is in at least one element of norm(T ) but does not appear
in ext(T ), then N will not appear in any element of nfd(ext(T )) and equivalence
will fail. If a node M is in ext(T ) but not in any element of norm(T ), then M will
appear in at least one element of nfd(ext(T )) and equivalence will fail. Therefore a
node is in ext(T ) if and only if it is in at least one element of norm(T ). 
Proof of Lemma 31. “if”. Suppose ext is subtree perfect and a node N is in ext(T ),
then N is in at least one element of norm(T ). Because nfd and stN commute, we
have
norm(stN (T )) = nfd(ext(stN (T ))) = nfd(stN (ext(T )))
= stN (nfd(ext(T ))) = stN (norm(T )).
This demonstrates subtree perfectness of norm.
“only if”. By Lemma 30, for a particular norm there can be no more than one
equivalent ext. We show that this ext is subtree perfect. A node N is in this ext
if and only if it is in at least one element of norm(T ). Similarly, a node M is in
stN (ext(T )) if and only ifM is in at least one element of stN (norm(T )). By subtree
perfectness of norm, the latter is satisfied if and only if M is in at least one element
of norm(stN (T )). But, again by definition of ext, the latter is satisfied if and only
if M is in ext(stN (T )). This establishes subtree perfectness of ext. 
Proof of Theorem 32. By Lemma 31, if an equivalent ext exists then it is subtree
perfect. We must show that the ext constructed in Lemma 30 satisfies
normopt(T ) = nfd(ext(T ))
for all consistent decision trees T .
We now proceed by structural induction. The base step, that nfd(ext(T )) =
normopt(T ) for any decision tree comprising only a single node, is as usual satisfied
trivially.
Let us proceed with the induction step. The induction hypothesis states that,
for any node K in ch(T ), nfd(ext(stK(T ))) = normopt(stK(T )). We must show that
normopt(T ) = nfd(ext(T )).
It is useful to show first that, if K is the set of all K ∈ ch(T ) that appear in at
least one element of normopt(T ) (or equivalently, that appear in ext(T )), then for
any K ∈ K,
(27) stK(nfd(ext(T ))) = stK(normopt(T )).
Consider any node K in ch(T ) that appears in ext(T ). Clearly,
stK(nfd(ext(T ))) = nfd(stK(ext(T )))
and since we just proved that ext is subtree perfect,
= nfd(ext(stK(T )))
and by the induction hypothesis,
= normopt(stK(T ))
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but, by definition of ext, the node K also appears in at least one element of
normopt(T ), so by the subtree perfectness of normopt,
= stK(normopt(T )).
This establishes Eq. (27).
Now, suppose that the root of T is a decision node. Observe that
nfd(ext(T )) =
⊔
K∈K
nfd(stK(ext(T ))),
and since st(·) and nfd(·) commute,
=
⊔
K∈K
stK(nfd(ext(T ))).
Also, because opt satisfies Properties 1 and 2, we have (as seen in the proof of
Theorem 22)
normopt(T ) =
⊔
K∈K
stK(normopt(T )),
whence by Eq. (27),
normopt(T ) = nfd(ext(T )).
Finally, suppose that the root of T is a chance node. Here, K is simply ch(T ) =
{K1, . . . ,Kn}. Similarly to before, we have
nfd(ext(T )) =
n⊙
i=1
Ei nfd(stKi(ext(T )))
=
n⊙
i=1
Ei stKi(nfd(ext(T ))).
Since opt satisfies Properties 1, 2, and 3, we have (as seen in the proof of Theo-
rem 22),
normopt(T ) =
n⊙
i=1
Ei normopt(stKi(T ))
=
n⊙
i=1
Ei stKi(normopt(T )),
whence by Eq. (27), we have
nfd(ext(T )) = normopt(T ).

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